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I. INTRODUCTION
Those familiar with federal arbitration law are undoubtedly familiar with
the various due process protocols that have evolved over the last eight years.
The first protocol, Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship (hereinafter
Employment Protocol), was created in 1995 by a task force of "individuals
from diverse organizations involved in labor and employment law"1 and
served as the model for the Due Process Protocol for Consumer Disputes
(hereinafter Consumer Protocol) and for the Health Care Due Process
Protocol (hereinafter Health Care Protocol), both created in 1998.2 Although
the protocols differ in some significant ways, they all seek to ensure a
minimally fair process for disputants by providing standards and procedures
that should be followed by arbitrators and arbitration service providers in the
conduct of the arbitrations to which they relate. All three protocols also
recognize the role that arbitration and mediation can play in the resolution of
various conflicts involving employees, consumers, and health care
participants. 3
The protocols have had a tremendous impact on arbitration; in many
ways, they have changed the face of arbitration of statutory employment
disputes and consumer disputes. Most significantly, this has occurred
because major arbitration service providers have agreed to follow the
protocols and have drafted rules consistent with the principles of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D. 1986
Georgetown University College of Law; B.A. 1982 Boston University. I would like to
thank Danial Bennett for his exceptional research assistance.
1 JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTEs 171 (1997). The Employment Protocol can be found in Appendix
B, at 171-78.
2 Due Process Protocol for Consumer Disputes: A Due Process Protocol for the
Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, PROGRAM BOOK (Comm'n on Health
Care Disp. Resol., ABA Section on Disp. Resol., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 30, 1999, at 43;
Health Care Due Process Protocol: A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Health Care Disputes, PROGRAM BOOK (Comm'n on Health Care Dispute
Resolution, ABA Section on Disp. Resol., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 30, 1999, at 1.
3 This Article will focus exclusively on the provisions of the protocols relating to
arbitration.
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protocols for the conduct of any arbitration governed by the protocols. 4 The
protocols' impact can be seen in other contexts as well. For example, the
protocols have acted as guideposts for various courts called upon to
determine the enforceability of a particular arbitration scheme.
5
Congressional efforts to amend the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) have also
been influenced by the protocols; various amendments have been proposed
that have sought to codify the standards set forth in the protocols for the
conduct of certain arbitration proceedings. 6 In addition, state arbitration law
may be affected by the protocols when a state considers the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA), which has been influenced, to some degree, by the
due process standards contained in the protocols.7
Although the protocols have had an impact on arbitration, they do not
have the force of law. They were developed by task forces and advisory
committees composed of various groups, including the arbitration industry,
interested in the resolution of disputes concerning employment, consumer,
and health care issues. The effectiveness of the protocols thus lies in the
voluntary agreement by arbitrators and arbitration service providers to
require adherence to the procedures called for in the protocols for the
administration and conduct of an arbitration proceeding. By voluntarily
agreeing to adhere to the requirements of the protocols, those providing
arbitration services have essentially agreed to regulate themselves. 8 As a self-
4 See infra notes 183-196 and accompanying text (discussing the voluntary adoption
by the major arbitration service providers of the principles set forth in the protocols).
5 See infra notes 228-256 and accompanying text (discussing how the standards set
forth in the protocols may influence judicial resolution of claims regarding the
enforceability of a certain arbitration agreements).
6 See infra notes 258-261 and accompanying text (discussing proposed amendments
to federal law requiring adherence to due process standards contained in the Employment
Protocol).
7 See infra notes 262-274 and accompanying text (discussing the RUAA); see also
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIs. L. REv. 831, 894
(discussing how drafters of the RUAA cite protocols as guideposts to determine
unconscionability of arbitration agreements).
8 As will be discussed infra, there is little governmental regulation of the arbitration
industry; accordingly, any attempt by the industry to control its own behavior is self-
regulatory. The early self-regulatory attempt by labor arbitrators is described by Mr.
Zack:
And most of all [arbitrators and the union and management advocates] shared a joint
commitment to develop a private system of conflict resolution to protect the rights
of the parties through due process. They were building a system which would
demonstrate to the grievants, the parties, the public, and the courts that self-
regulation was workable, acceptable to all the participants, and worthy of acceptance
and respect as a credible judicial institution.
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regulatory effort, the protocols seek to infuse arbitration with certain due
process protections, thereby filling the procedural gap that was created when
the United States Supreme Court endorsed the use of arbitration for the
resolution of statutory claims. They also seek to encourage and promote the
use of alternative dispute resolution for certain disputes. By committing itself
to ensuring that due process protections are provided, the arbitration
industry's decision to regulate itself may have helped to legitimize the
prevalent and growing use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts of
adhesion. It may also have been instrumental in fending off more direct
government regulation of the arbitration industry and in maintaining the
favored status the Supreme Court has bestowed upon arbitration.
Irrespective of the desirability of those achievements, it is an open
question whether those achievements are well earned by the industry's self-
regulatory effort. The efficacy of self-regulation to control the conduct of
members or firms in an industry or profession in a manner consistent with the
public interest and with the standards adopted by the industry is also open to
question. Self-regulation generally has a "tarnished image." 9 Opponents of
self-regulation tend to view such regulation as a "sham-a cynical attempt by
self-interested parties to give the appearance of regulation (thereby warding
off more direct government intervention) while serving private interests at
the expense of the public." 10 Proponents, however, believe that self-
regulation is preferable to government command and control regulation
because it is more efficient-standards are created by industry experts, and
are thus more flexible and practicable, which leads to more effective
policing.1' As will be discussed, some of the concerns raised by typical
industry self-regulation are not implicated to the same degree by the
arbitration industry's creation and adoption of the due process protocols.
Unlike industry self-regulation, where only members of the industry play a
role in the formation of the governing standards, the protocols were
developed not only by firms in the industry but also by others who had an
interest and a stake in the formation of due process standards. Accordingly,
the drafting committees and task forces responsible for the protocols were
not clearly dominated by the industry. This factor helps the protocols avoid
Arnold Zack, Dissemination and Enforcement of the Code of Ethics, in ARBITRATION
1988 EMERGING ISSUES FOR THE 1990S, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41 sr ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 216, 216 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1989).
9 Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry:
Assessing Responsible Care, 17 LAW & POL'Y 57, 58 (1995).
10 Id.
11 Id.
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the categorical "sham" label and gives them a greater chance of success in
gaining credibility than exists for typical industry self-regulation.
The fact that the protocols did not originate solely within the industry
does not mean that the industry's agreement to follow the protocols will be
effective in meeting the goals of the protocols. For any self-regulatory effort
to succeed, provisions must exist to monitor individual firms' compliance
with the protocols and to sanction noncompliance when discovered. Such
monitoring and enforcement provisions are absent in each of the protocols.
The absence of such provisions threatens to undermine the efficacy of the
self-regulatory effort. The lack of such provisions makes it impossible to
determine if the due process protocols are in fact being followed by
individual arbitrators and arbitration service providers in actual cases. This
deficiency is significant, not only for the obvious reason that it may mean
that disputants are being deprived of essential due process protections in the
arbitral forum, but also because it may impact the willingness of certain
providers to adhere to the protocols. Such providers may be reluctant to
follow the due process standards and reject cases that violate the protocols
because they cannot be assured that others are following the same rules. This
is a significant impact because the existence of the protocols and the
agreement by providers to follow the protocols has helped restore the
public's perception of arbitration, leading some to believe that all disputants
are given a level playing field in the arbitral process. Accordingly, the
existence of free-riders-those who do not conform to the protocols but who
nonetheless benefit from the reputational enhancement the protocols have
given arbitration and from the lack of direct government regulation---can
seriously weaken the efficacy of the regulation. Thus, monitoring and
enforcement provisions that identify and deter free-riders are essential if the
protocols are to succeed in regulating the conduct of the arbitration industry.
Without such provisions, the benefits sought by the self-regulatory effort will
be unattainable.
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate the effectiveness of the
protocols as self-regulatory instruments and to suggest ways that such
effectiveness can be improved. The effectiveness of the protocols cannot be
analyzed, however, without an understanding of the goals the drafters of the
protocols hoped to achieve when the protocols were created. Accordingly,
Part II of this Article will detail the origins of the protocols. The factors that
motivated their creation, endorsement, and adoption by the arbitration
industry and their intended role in promoting arbitration as an alternative to
judicial resolution of disputes will be highlighted. That discussion will
demonstrate how the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v.
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Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,12 the findings of the Dunlop Commission,
and the unilateral imposition of arbitration clauses in employment, consumer,
and health care contracts contributed to the formation of the protocols. The
sources of the due process standards articulated in the protocols will also be
discussed. Part II concludes with a discussion of some of the more significant
effects the protocols have had on arbitration law and practice.
Part I of this Article will analyze and critique the protocols as self-
regulatory instruments. The use of the protocols to control collective action
by firms and individuals in the arbitration industry will be described, and the
success of the protocols for achieving collective benefits will be discussed.
The adequacy of the standards will be analyzed from a number of
perspectives, including their ability to overcome the inevitable credibility
obstacle all self-regulatory efforts encounter, to obtain commitments from
firms in the industry, and to prevent free-riders from undermining the
efficacy of the protocols. Part I will conclude with suggestions for how the
protocols' effectiveness can be enhanced. The suggestions will focus on the
inclusion of monitoring and sanctioning provisions and will describe how
inclusion of such provisions can benefit both the industry and the public.
II. THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF THE PROTOCOLS
A. Origins
A confluence of factors led to the creation of the first protocol, the
Employment Protocol.13 The Gilmer decision made it apparent that due
process protections were needed when statutory employment claims were
arbitratable. This led commentators to call upon both the judiciary and the
legislature to impose such standards. 14 However, the work of the
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, chaired by
John T. Dunlop 15 (the "Dunlop Commission") appears to have been the
12 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
13 The factors that led to the creation of the Employment Protocol are also
significant to an understanding of the origins of the Consumer and the Health Care
Protocols.
14 See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of
Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 639, 660-665; Lewis Maltby, Paradise
Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to
Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 1, 10-11 (1994).
15 Professor Dunlop was the Secretary of Labor from 1975 to 1976. See
http://www.labor.gov/asp/programs/history/dunlop.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
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impetus for the crafting of the Employment Protocol as a self-regulatory
instrument. 16
The Gilmer decision 17 lies at the heart of the Commission's work and the
protocols. Without the Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitration for
statutory employment disputes, the Commission could not have
recommended private arbitration as a means for remedying the judicial and
administrative failures found in connection with claims alleging employment
discrimination. Conversely, the Commission's work with respect to the
development of standards that should be followed in the private arbitration of
employment disputes, which helped form the basis of the Employment
Protocol, would not have been necessary if the Gilmer Court had articulated
the necessary standards for the arbitration of such a dispute. Accordingly,
any discussion of the origins of the protocols must start with Gilmer.
1. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.18
The Supreme Court in Gilmer was called upon to determine whether a
claim brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) could be subjected to arbitration in accordance with an arbitration
clause contained in a "Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration or Transfer" (U-4).19 Completion of the U-4, which registered
Gilmer as a securities representative with, among others, the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), was a condition of Gilmer's employment. 20
According to the U-4 and the applicable stock exchange rules, Gilmer's
16 See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage From
Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 425
(2000).
17 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991).
18 Id.
19 The Supreme Court found that the U-4 application signed by Gilmer was not an
employment contract. That finding permitted the Court to avoid the issue of whether
arbitration clauses in employment contracts were enforceable under the FAA. Id. at 25
n.2. Section 1 of the FAA exempts from its coverage "... contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The Court did eventually reach the issue of the scope of
section l's exemption. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001),
the Court held that employment contracts were covered by the FAA unless the
employment agreement covered workers engaged in transportation.
20 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
[Vol. 19:2 2004]
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS
employment claim against his employer was subjected to arbitration at the
NYSE in accordance with NYSE arbitration rules. 21
Although the Court had previously determined that claims based on
violation of federal statutory law could be arbitrated,22 Gilmer argued that
claims based on the ADEA were not arbitrable because compulsory
arbitration was inconsistent with the purposes of the ADEA.23 In support,
Gilmer focused on the procedures of the arbitral forum in which his claim
would be heard and the fact that unequal bargaining power existed between
himself, the employee, and his employer, who required arbitration as a
condition of employment.
Gilmer's concerns about arbitral procedures were not unfounded and, in
some respect, echoed concerns the Court itself had raised regarding
arbitration of employment discrimination claims. Prior to Gilmer, the Court
had determined that employees covered by collective bargaining agreements
could bring Title VII claims in federal court after they had submitted their
claims to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of their
collective bargaining agreement. 24 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,25
21 Id. The NYSE has since abandoned its practice of requiring its registered
representatives to arbitrate their employment discrimination claims against their
employers, although an individual employer may still require arbitration of such claims.
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989) (raising a claim based on, among other things, Securities Act of 1933);
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (raising claims
based on Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 633 (1985) (raising a claim based on the Sherman Act).
23 In determining the arbitrability of a claim, the Court looks to whether Congress
intended to preclude waiver of a judicial forum for the particular statutory claim. Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 26. Congress's intent can be found in the text of the statute, its legislative
history, or an inherent conflict between the statute's purpose and arbitration. Id. Gilmer
relied only on the inherent conflict argument in support of his position that claims based
on the ADEA are not arbitrable. Id. at 26-27.
24 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974); see also
McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (noting that because an arbitration
proceeding cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial trial, a federal court is not
permitted to give an unappealed grievance arbitration award preclusive effect in a § 1983
action brought in federal court); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728, 743 (1981) (holding that an employee not precluded from bringing claim in federal
court based on violation of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) after having unsuccessfully
brought claim to a joint grievance committee pursuant to collective bargaining agreement
because, in part, "arbitrators may not be conversant with the public law considerations
underlying the FLSA").
25 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36.
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the Court stated that arbitration was an "inappropriate forum for the final
resolution of rights created by Title VII. ' 26 In addition to questioning the
competency of arbitrators to handle Title VII claims,27 the Court also took
issue with typical arbitration procedures. It stated:
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as
complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process,
cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or
unavailable. And... arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their
reasons for an award. 28
Gilmer was unable to persuade the Court to continue to follow Gardner-
Denver and its progeny. 29 The Court held that Gilmer had not carried his
burden of showing that arbitration of an ADEA claim, pursuant to the NYSE
arbitration rules, would be in conflict with the ADEA's underlying
purposes. 30
With respect to unequal bargaining power, the Court held that "[m]ere
inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. 31
In support, the Court noted that it had previously upheld arbitration of claims
brought by investors against their securities dealers, which relationship may
also involve unequal bargaining power.32 While recognizing that courts
"should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to
arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power
that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract," the Court
found no indication that Gilmer was either coerced or defrauded into
agreeing to the arbitration clause. 33 The fact that Gilmer had no choice but to
agree to the clause was not specifically discussed by the Court.
The Court rejected each argument made by Gilmer concerning the
procedural inadequacies of the arbitral forum, either on the basis that the
rules were sufficient or on the basis that the Court had previously rejected
2 6 Id. at 56.
27 Arbitrators' specialized competency "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not
the law of the land." Id. at 57.
28 Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted).
29 See supra note 24.
30 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991).
31 Id. at 33.
32 Id.




such a challenge. 34 Gilmer challenged the potential partiality of the
arbitrators, the adequacy of discovery, the lack of written opinions by the
arbitrators, the limited judicial review of arbitration decisions, and the
insufficiency of equitable relief.35
With respect to Gilmer's concern about potential bias, without a specific
showing that the NYSE "provisions [were] inadequate to guard against
potential bias," the Court refused to "indulge the presumption that the parties
and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to
retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators." 36 The Court also
found that the NYSE arbitration rules and the FAA protect against bias.37
The fact that discovery in a NYSE arbitration was not as extensive as
that available in federal court also did not persuade the Court to find
arbitration inadequate to protect Gilmer's rights.38 The Court first noted that
it had upheld claims based on other statutory rights where the discovery
needs would likely be similar to the discovery needs for an ADEA claim.39
The Court stated that "[iut is unlikely.., that age discrimination claims
require more extensive discovery than other claims that we have found to be
arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims." 40 The Court then noted that
the NYSE rules do in fact permit certain discovery and that Gilmer had not
asserted that those particular discovery provisions were "insufficient to allow
ADEA claimants... a fair opportunity to present their claims." 41
Gilmer asserted that the lack of a written opinion by the arbitrators made
arbitration inadequate to further the purposes of the ADEA for a number of
reasons: the public would not learn of the discriminatory practices of an
employer, the development of ADEA law would be retarded, and appellate
review of the arbitrators' decision would be detrimentally impacted. 42
The Court first noted that the NYSE arbitration rules did, in fact, require
a written award which was made available to the public.43 The written award
34 Id. at 30-32.
35 Id.
36 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-





41 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31. The Court also noted that the evidentiary rules are
inapplicable in an arbitration proceeding to counterbalance the reduced discovery that is
available to the parties.
4 2 Id. at 31.
43 Id. at 31-32.
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included a summary of the issues and a description of the award issued.44
The Court was not concerned that ADEA law would stagnate by making
ADEA claims subject to arbitration because "it is unlikely that all or even
most ADEA claimants will be subject to arbitration agreements. '45 The
concern raised by Gilmer regarding the impact on the public of arbitration of
ADEA claims was not shared by the Court inasmuch as those concerns
"apply equally to settlements of ADEA claims, which.., are clearly
allowed." 46
The Court addressed Gilmer's concern about the limited judicial review
of arbitration awards by merely noting that it had previously rejected this
argument by finding that "'such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators
comply with the requirements of the statute at issue." 47
Gilmer's final challenge to the arbitration procedure concerned the lack
of a provision for "broad equitable relief and class actions."'48 Because
arbitrators under NYSE rules had the "power to fashion equitable relief," and
the NYSE rules contained provisions for "collective proceedings," the Court
rejected the challenge. 49 The Court also noted that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) would not be precluded under an
arbitration agreement from bringing its own action "seeking class-wide and
equitable relief."50
After finding the NYSE arbitral process adequate for the vindication of
an ADEA claim, the Court explained why it declined to follow the Gardner-
Denver line of cases.5 1 First, the Court noted that the mistrust expressed by
the Court in those cases "[had] been undermined by [its] recent arbitration
decisions." 52 In support, the Court cited to McMahon and Mitsubishi, where
it had upheld arbitration of claims based on the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and on the Sherman Act, respectively. 53 In Gilmer, the Court
44 Id.
45 Id. at 32.
46 Id.
47 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4 (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
48 Id. at 32.
49 Id.
50Id. In EEOC. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291-92 (2002), the Supreme
Court upheld the EEOC's right to bring an enforcement action seeking victim-specific
relief for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act on behalf of an employee who
had agreed to arbitrate any dispute or claim he had with his employer concerning his
employment.
51 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
52 Id. at 34 n.5.
53 Id; see supra note 22.
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apparently did not see a reason to treat arbitration of a claim based on a
violation of a civil rights statute any differently than it treated arbitration of
the federal claims at issue in McMahon and Mitsubishi, which arose from
commercial transactions. 54 Contrary to the Court, one commentator has
articulated an important reason for treating statutory employment and
commercial claims differently:
One of the distinguishing factors between the employment and commercial
cases is that statutory civil rights laws have been promulgated, at least in
part, to protect interests that we deem important to society. Thus, when a
decision is rendered on a civil rights claim, its effect is felt by society as a
whole. In contrast, decisions on commercial claims generally affect only the
parties to the litigation. 55
The Court then distinguished the Gardner-Denver line of cases on
several grounds. 56 The issue in those cases, the Court pointed out, was
different than the issue in Gilmer. Gilmer involved the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement, whereas the Gardner-Denver cases involved the issue
of "whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent
judicial resolution of statutory claims."'57 In addition, arbitration in the
Gardner-Denver line of cases occurred because the collective bargaining
agreements required it and the employees were represented by their unions. 58
Thus, a "tension" existed "between collective representation and individual
statutory rights," which was absent in Gilmer.59 Lastly, the Court stated that
Gilmer's case was governed by the FAA and its "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements," which was inapplicable to the collective
bargaining arbitration cases. 60
54 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1017,
1030-31 (1996) ("The Gilmer Court's reasoning was based on a series of recent Supreme
Court cases about commercial arbitration under the FAA.").
55 Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public
Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 173, 177 (1998) (citations omitted).
56 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective
Bargaining Context, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 491, 494-495 (2001) for a
discussion of additional distinctions between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer.
57 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
58 See id.
59 Id. Gilmer was not a member of a union and the arbitration clause was not
contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
60 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 625 (1985)).
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The Gilmer decision "set in motion one of the most dramatic shifts in the
governance of employment relations of recent times, '61 and it is significant
for a number of reasons. First, it upheld mandatory arbitration of a claim
based on a federal employment statute. Second, it found the NYSE
arbitration procedures sufficient for Gilmer to adequately vindicate his
statutory rights. These findings have been thoroughly critiqued by numerous
scholars.62 The critiques will not be repeated here except to note that one
commentator, who, generally believing that Gilmer could be a "blessing" to
employees by providing them with "meaningful access to justice," also
feared that Gilmer could force "employees to take their complaints to
tribunals that are no better than kangaroo courts. '63
Gilmer, however, left many questions open, some of which have since
been answered by the Court64 and others that await answers. Some of the
more significant questions that remain are: (i) the arbitrability of claims
based on other civil rights statutes; 65 (ii) Gilmer's application to union
employees and its impact on Gardner-Denver where the arbitration clause is
contained in a collective bargaining agreement and explicitly covers claims
based on federal civil rights statutes;66 (iii) the kind of consent that is needed
61 Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and
Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 643, 643
(2001).
62 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived"
and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33; Stone, supra
note 54, at 1017.
63 Maltby, supra note 14, at 2-3.
64 See supra notes 19 (discussing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001)) and 50 (discussing E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002)).
65 Lower courts have overwhelmingly found claims based on Title VII arbitrable.
See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1999); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); Seus v. John
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has just recently joined those circuits;
see E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g
en banc granted, 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003).
66 The Supreme Court dodged this question in Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp.,
525 U.S. 70 (1998). There, the Court declined to reach the issue of whether a union-
negotiated waiver of an employee's statutory right to a judicial forum for an employment
discrimination claim would be enforceable after Gilmer because it found the arbitration
clause too general to meet the standard for a "clear and unmistakable" waiver. Id. at 80-
81.
Most courts that have considered the issue have held that Gilmer does not supercede
the holding of Gardner-Denver. See St. Antoine, supra note 56, at 495-96 (discussing
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to bind an employee to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement; 67 and (iv) the
minimum procedural standards that must exist to ensure the adequate
vindication of an employee's statutory rights. Lower courts and legal
scholars have grappled with these open issues since the Gilmer decision.68
It is, of course, the last open question that led to the development of the
protocols. While the Supreme Court found the NYSE procedures sufficient to
uphold arbitration of the ADEA claim, it did not explicitly hold that those, or
similar procedures, were in fact necessary or required in order for a claimant
to be compelled to arbitrate a claim based on the ADEA or another
employment related statute. Nor did the Court give any guidance as to the
minimum procedures, if any, that must be present for a claimant to
adequately vindicate his or her statutory rights in the arbitral forum.
The only insight the Court has provided since Gilmer, arguably related to
the procedures of the arbitral forum, can be found in Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.69 There, a consumer claimed that an arbitration
agreement, requiring her to arbitrate claims based on the Truth in Lending
Act against a financing company, was unenforceable because the agreement
was silent with respect to payment of arbitral filing fees and other costs and
expenses.70 Although the Supreme Court declined to find the agreement
unenforceable on that basis alone, it nevertheless stated that "the existence of
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from effectively
status of law and noting that the Fourth Circuit "stands alone in concluding that Gilmer
has superseded Gardner-Denver even with [respect] to collective bargaining
agreements").
67 See St. Antoine, supra note 56, at 497 n.33 ("The federal courts have used at least
three different approaches to the necessary state of mind for holding an employee bound
by an agreement to arbitrate.").
68 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How Much? Questions
Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 589, 592 (2001) (discussing
fallout from Gilmer that lower courts have addressed).
At least one commentator has noted that Gilmer, by addressing the procedural
safeguards contained in the NYSE arbitration rules, did in fact establish the procedural
minimums that must be present in order for the arbitral forum to satisfactorily enforce the
statutory rights at issue. See Gorman, supra note 14, at 645. However, Professor Stone
has noted that lower courts were not reading Gilmer as establishing the NYSE arbitration
rules "as a precondition to enforcing an employment law arbitration." Stone, supra note
54, at 1044. Rather, she notes that courts were upholding arbitration of statutory claims
without regard to the procedures applicable in the arbitration. See id.
69 Green Tree Fin. Corp.- Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
70 See id. at 83-84.
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vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum." 71 Although it is
clear that arbitral costs cannot be so expensive as to bar a claimant from
proceeding in the arbitral forum, the Court did not provide any guidance to
determine when that is the case. That exact issue has been the subject of
much litigation in the lower courts. 72
The FAA is also silent as to specific procedures that must be present in
order for a court to compel arbitration of a civil rights claim.73 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has previously stated that "[t]here is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy
is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private
agreements to arbitrate." 74 Under that reasoning, the procedures provided for
in the parties' contract should control and a court should enforce the
arbitration agreement with its privately contracted for process, subject only to
the claim that the arbitration agreement is void pursuant to state contract law.
The FAA provides that arbitration agreements shall be enforceable "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 75
However, because claims based on public laws are at stake and because
the agreement to arbitrate is generally a contract of adhesion between the
employee and the employer, Gilmer cannot be read to permit arbitration
71 Id. at 90. Justice Ginsburg took issue with the Court's decision to place the burden
of showing financial inaccessibility on the consumer. She would have remanded the case
for clarification of Green Tree's practice. See id. at 96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72 See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment
Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2002) (analyzing how lower courts handle
enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreement when costs associated with arbitration
are alleged to be prohibitively high).
73 That omission is not surprising given the fact that the FAA was enacted almost 40
years prior to the enactment of the first civil rights act.
74 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
75 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). The Court has held that the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement can be challenged based on "generally applicable contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability .... Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996).
The Supreme Court's lack of guidance is even more problematic when the reach of
the FAA and its preemptory effect is considered. The Court has held that the FAA
reaches agreements that "affect" interstate commerce and that it creates federal
substantive law that preempts state law or policy that conflicts with the FAA. Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995); see, e.g., Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). The preemptive reach of the FAA has resulted in the
Supreme Court finding that states cannot prohibit arbitration altogether nor can a state
condition the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on compliance with special
notice requirements. See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688.
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under any set of procedural rules. 76 Such a reading would in fact be
inconsistent with Gilmer insofar as the Court there analyzed the discovery
provisions set forth in the NYSE rules to determine if they provided
claimants "a fair opportunity to present their claims." 77 It is thus reasonable
to read Gilmer as requiring certain minimum standards. Unfortunately, the
Court did not identify those specific standards. Case law and legislative
action could identify those standards. Indeed, case law has already done that
to some degree.78 The Employment Protocol, which specifically states that its
focus was on "exemplary" standards of due process for mandatory arbitration
of statutory employment claims, represents another approach to such
standard setting.79
The Gilmer Court's approval of arbitration as a means to resolve
employee disputes caused many employers to require, as a condition of
employment, that their employees waive their right to a judicial forum and
instead use arbitration if a dispute arose.80 The increase in the number of
disputes by employees against their employers also had a tremendous bearing
on employers' decisions to require arbitration as the dispute resolution
process of choice for employees' claims, including statutory claims. 81 The
increased use of court sanctioned mandatory arbitration clauses by employers
made it imperative that the procedural void left by Gilmer be filled.
Employers were unilaterally crafting arbitration agreements, binding
employees to arbitration procedures chosen solely by the employer. Because
of a drafting party's natural inclination to draft contract terms favorable to
itself,82 significant concerns were raised about the fairness of those
76 See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 14, at 644 ("The Supreme Court in the Gilmer case
did not hold that any sort of arbitration procedure before any manner of arbitrator would
be satisfactory in the adjudication of public rights.").
77 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
78 See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-84 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
79 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at 173. But see Lisa B. Bingham, Self-
Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 873, 895 (2002) (characterizing standards contained in Employment Protocol as
"minimum" standards); Stone, supra note 54, at 1045.
80 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Dispute Resolution in the Boundaryless
Workplace, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 467, 467 (2001) (noting a "dramatic increase
in the number of non-union firms adopting arbitration systems" since Gilmer).
81 Gorman, supra note 14, at 640-41 (after discussion of the "dramatic increase in
employment-related litigation," author concludes: "[ljittle wonder that many employers
have taken the Gilmer decision to heart and have moved with increased frequency to draft
and incorporate arbitration provisions in employment applications or agreements .... ").
82 See, e.g., DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at 96 ("The employer alone develops the
arbitration procedure, and understandably inserts elements that favor its position.").
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arbitration systems crafted and required by employers. The need to gain an
advantage in a dispute resolution process has been aptly described by
Professor Ackerman:
When disputants employ an adjudicative model of conflict resolution, they
forfeit their autonomy with respect to the ultimate decision-making. A
device chosen to assert one's ego (as communitarians critical of litigation
might describe it) ironically requires loss of control to others: lawyers who
put the device in motion, judges and juries who make the ultimate
decisions. The frustration stemming from loss of control often leads
disputants to try to rig the game, tilt the playing field, and place their
thumbs on the scales of justice.83
The Employment Protocol at least promised to level the playing field for
employees.
Gap-filling, although a particularly critical purpose of the protocols, was
not the only purpose. The protocols were also developed to encourage the use
of arbitration to resolve disputes. In many respects, such encouragement was
due to the belief that arbitration was superior to the judicial process.
Arbitration promised expert decisionmaking; its informal nature would help
to minimize the adversarial tone of the dispute or help mend broken
relationships; it would be quick, efficient, and final. In other respects the
encouragement of arbitration was due to the fact that the judicial process had
"broken down." It had failed to provide justice for those least likely to be
able to afford it, and it had failed to ensure that our public values, as reflected
in our public laws, were adequately furthered or vindicated.84 The
Employment Protocol's secondary purpose, to encourage the use of
alternatives to judicial resolution of public law disputes, is made apparent by
the direct link between the development of the Employment Protocol and the
work of the Dunlop Commission, which is detailed in the following section.
2. The Dunlop Commission's Findings and Recommendations
In March, 1993, at President Clinton's request, the Secretaries of
Commerce (Ronald H. Brown) and Labor (Robert B. Reich) announced the
creation of the Dunlop Commission.85 The Commission, formed to
83 Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for
Community, 18 OHiO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 27, 62-63 (2002).
84 See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
85 See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT-
FINDING REPORT xi (May 1994) [hereinafter FACT-FINDING REPORT]. The Mission
Statement of the Comnission stated: "The future living standards of our nation's people,
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"investigate the current state of worker-management relations in the United
States," 86 was asked to respond to three questions, one of which is
particularly pertinent: "What (if anything) should be done to increase the
extent to which work-place problems are directly resolved by the parties
themselves, rather than through recourse to state and federal courts and
government regulatory bodies?" 87
In answer to that question, the Commission, after a period of fact-finding
and testimony, recommended the voluntary use of binding arbitration to
resolve disputes based on violations of federal statutory employment laws. 88
That recommendation, and the findings upon which it was based, directly led
to the creation of the Employment Protocol.
a. Failure of the Judicial and Administrative Systems to
Provide Access to Justice for All Employees
In its Fact-Finding Report, the Commission provided detailed
information regarding the then current state of conflict resolution of
employment disputes.89 After describing the increase in the number of laws
regulating the workplace and the employment relationship, and noting the
exponential growth in employment claims brought in the federal courts and
to the related administrative agencies, the Commission found that few
employees, particularly low-wage employees, had access to justice. Justice
was inaccessible because of the costs, delays, and other barriers associated
with bringing claims in either the judicial forum or to an administrative
agency. 90 That result was particularly troubling inasmuch as many of the
as well as the competitiveness of the United States, depend largely on the one national
resource uniquely rooted within our borders: our people-their education and skills, and
their capabilities to work together productively."
86 Id.
87 Id. The other two questions were:
1. What (if any) new methods or institutions should be encouraged, or required,
to enhance work-place productivity through labor-management cooperation and
employee participation?
2. What (if any) changes should be made in the present legal framework and
practices of collective bargaining to enhance cooperative behavior, improve
productivity, and reduce conflict and delay?
Id.
88 See THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 59-60 (1995) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
89 See FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 85, passim.
90 See id. at 112-13; see also, DUNLOP& ZACK, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv ("It was out
of the mounting evidence of the lack of access to fairness and statutory protections that
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employment laws "focus[ed] on value-laden issues like racial and gender
discrimination, occupational hazards, privacy invasions, and the like," 91 laws
that were intended to do more than provide redress but to also "change the
mores or customs prevailing in many workplaces." 9
2
In. addition to its concern for justice for low-wage employees, the
Commission also appeared concerned with the possible anticompetitive
effect of unequal enforcement of the employment laws.93 The Commission
recognized that if employees were unable to have their claims redressed,
those firms that violated the law would have a competitive advantage over
those firms that complied with the law. 94
In its Fact-Finding Report, the Commission cited private dispute
resolution processes, including mediation and arbitration, as possible means
to provide employees the access to justice they were being denied because of
the high costs and delay of traditional litigation. 95 The Commission cited
with approval the grievance arbitration process that had been developed
under collective bargaining agreements and found that "[p]rivate arbitration
has served as an effective and flexible process for resolving issues covered
under collective bargaining agreements." 96 Recognizing the potential of
private arbitration, the Commission noted that "[tihe difficult practical issue
concerns the key safeguards that must be built in to any employment ADR
[alternative dispute resolution] model." 97
The Commission' s endorsement of ADR was buttressed by its belief that
public sentiment had changed concerning the virtues of ADR. In support of
that belief, the Commission noted that Congress supported the use of ADR
for the resolution of claims based on civil rights violations. The Commission
cited to language in the Civil Rights Reform Act of 1991 that specifically
the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations proposed the
establishment of systems of statutory dispute resolution with due process protection.").
91 FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 85, at 109.
92 Id.; see also Stone, supra note 54, at 1043:
[S]tatutory employment rights are enacted when[ever] a legislature believes that
workers cannot adequately protect themselves simply by bargaining with their
employers. That is, they reflect a legislature's view of market failure in the
contracting process. Legislatures act to ensure healthy and safe workplaces, protect
privacy on the job, or to provide other protections when they believe that there is a
public policy concern so compelling that it warrants intervening in the wage bargain.
93 FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 72.
94 Id.
95 FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 85, at 113.
96 Id. at 122.
97 Id. at 118.
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encouraged alternative methods to resolving claims based on employment
discrimination. 98
In addition to the language the Commission relied upon, Congress had
also affirmatively endorsed alternative dispute resolution in other arenas. For
example, the Commission noted that Congress had passed in 1990 the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,99 which required federal agencies to
"adopt a policy that addresses the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution and case management."' 100 In the same year, Congress had also
passed the Civil Justice Reform Act, which required each federal district
court, with the assistance of advisory committees, to evaluate the use of
alternative dispute resolution programs.' 0 ' Passage of those two pieces of
legislation reflected Congress's concern about the efficacy of the traditional
models of dispute resolution used by both its administrative agencies and its
court system.
The Commission's concern regarding the accessibility of the judicial and
administration systems for low-wage employees reflects the widely shared
belief that "preservation of 'individual rights requires an accessible legal
system for their protection' and enforcement."1 02 It clearly promoted
mediation and arbitration as alternative means to achieve access to justice.
b. Need for Standards Due to Unilateral Imposition of
Arbitration by Employers
After publication of its Fact-Finding Report, the Commission heard
testimony regarding non-union employer arbitration systems. Apparently
emboldened by Gilmer, and undoubtedly in response to the amendments to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided victims of intentional
98 Id. at 117. In its Final Report, the Commission also relied on similar language in
other civil rights statutes and lamented the fact that, despite Congressional
encouragement of ADR, administrative and judicial backlogs had risen sharply. FINAL
REPORT, supra note 88, at 72.
Professor Gorman has argued that Congress's legislative endorsement of ADR in
these statutes is diluted by language in committee reports that "suggests that arbitration is
not an adequate substitute for litigation and that arbitral errors can be subsequently set
aright in a court proceeding." Gorman, supra note 14, at 659 n.76.
99 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 72.
100 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 3, 104
Stat. 2736, 2736.
101 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089-
137.
102 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d at 1482 (citing JEROLD AUERBACH,
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 144-45 (1983)).
387
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
discrimination the right to, among other things, compensatory and punitive
damages 10 3 and a jury trial, 1°4 the Commission noted that employers
imposed such systems as a condition of employment in order to combat "the
expansion of litigation and costs." 10 5 Although some of those systems
appeared "serious and fair," 10 6 "[m]any of [the] unilaterally established
systems... [did] not meet the [test] of fairness" 10 7 and were of "dubious
merit for enforcing the public values embedded in our laws." 108
The systems crafted by individual employers in the non-union context
could always be subject to the whim of the employer. In sharp contrast to the
arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement, where the
union is present to represent the interests of and negotiate on behalf of the
employee, the arbitration clause in the non-union employment arena is
typically drafted by the employer and presented to the employee on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. "Thus, employers are free to structure arbitration in ways
that may systematically disadvantage employees."' 1 9 Safeguards were clearly
needed to provide employees protection from the potential abusive practices
of the employer.
In furtherance of its belief that arbitration could play a role in the private
resolution of employment disputes if those safeguards were present,
Chairman Dunlop asked Arnold M. Zack, then president of the National
Academy of Arbitrators,1 10 to draft a list of due process standards that should
103 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
104 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000).
105 FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 73.
106 Id. at 51.
107 Id. at 73.
108 Id. at 51-52 (footnote omitted).
109 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment
Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 254-55 (1983)):
In non-unionized private sector employment, there is no organization analogous to
the union to represent employee interests in developing arbitration procedures.
Therefore, the employer and its lawyers have a comparatively free hand in drafting
the details of an arbitration clause .... Under these circumstances, some employers
may seek to unfairly narrow the legal rights of employees in the arbitration clause.
Id.
110 The National Academy of Arbitrators (NAF) is a "non-profit professional and
honorary organization of arbitrators," See http://www.naarb.org/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2003). Pursuant to its by-laws, the NAA seeks to "establish and foster the highest
standards of integrity, competence, honor and character among those engaged in
arbitration of labor-management disputes on a professional basis." Id. The NAA, in
association with others, has created a Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators
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be applied in an "employer-promulgated arbitration system" dealing with
discrimination issues. lII Having found consensus regarding the safeguards
from others who testified, 112 the Commission endorsed and encouraged the
use of alternative dispute resolution systems,'1 3 including binding arbitration,
for resolution of employment discrimination claims. Such endorsement was
conditioned on such systems being voluntary and containing "high quality
standards for fairness, due process, and accountability to the goals and
remedies established in the relevant law." 114 The Commission believed such
alternatives would provide cost effective and fair resolution of claims, and
would "serve as effective deterrents to unfair behavior or employer
practices,"' 115 thereby alleviating the economic" 16 and social impact caused
by the judicial and administrative systems failure to provide access to justice
for all employees.
With respect to binding arbitration of public law disputes, the
Commission listed seven standards that should be present in an employer
promulgated system: (i) neutral and knowledgeable arbitrator, selected by
both the employer and the employee; (ii) simple methods for an employee to
secure information related to his or her claim; (iii) a fair method of cost
sharing to ensure affordable access, ideally with a cap on the employee's
contribution in proportion to his or her pay; (iv) the right to representation at
the arbitration if the employee so desires; (v) the opportunity for the
employee to obtain the same range of remedies that the employee would be
entitled to if the claim were brought in a judicial forum; (vi) an
understandable written opinion, by the arbitrator detailing the findings of fact
and the reason for the decision; and (vii) judicial review of the award
of Labor-Management Disputes. See http://www.naarb.org/code.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2003).
111 Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, DisP. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 36, 36.
112 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 56.
113 Among other things, the Commission envisioned the development of in-house
alternative dispute resolution systems to deal with employees' claims. See id. at 52.
114 Id. at 11.
115 Id. at 21.
116 In addition to discussing the direct costs associated with litigation of workplace
disputes (the Commission found that for every dollar paid to an employee through
litigation, at least another was paid to attorneys handing both meritorious and non-
meritorious claims), the Commission also noted the costs associated with the design by
some employers of "defensive personnel practices." All these costs, the Commission
found, reduced the resources that were available for compensation and other benefits to
employees. Id. at 49.
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sufficient to determine whether the arbitrator's decision is consistent with the
applicable law.117
Significantly, the Commission did not endorse arbitration as a condition
of employment. The, Commission believed that the wronged individual,
rather than the employment contract, should make the choice as to the
process to be used. 118 Accordingly, the Commission's endorsement of
alternatives was based on such alternatives being used on a voluntary basis.
c. Creation of the Task Force on Alternative Dispute
Resolution and the Development of the Employment
Protocol
Mr. Zack raised his concerns regarding the proper safeguards that should
exist in an arbitration system for the resolution of employment disputes in the
non-union setting with the Council of the Labor and Employment Law
Section of the American Bar Association. 119 Two members of the Council
suggested the creation of a committee of representatives from organizations
"with a stake in fair due process."' 120 Members of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), 12' the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), the National Employment
Lawyers Association (NELA), the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA),
and the American Bar Association (ABA) formed a Task Force on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, which began its work in September 1994.122
Finding that it "shared similar views of due process, felt such standards could
be codified, and believed [it] should proclaim such unanimity to those
charged with the responsibility of developing dispute settlement procedures
in the employment field,"12 3 the Task Force drafted the Employment Due
Process Protocol. The Protocol was unveiled in May 1995,124 a few months
after the Dunlop Commission issued its Final Report. The members of the
117 See id. at 56-58.
118 See id. at 59.
119 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at xviii.
120 Zack, supra note 111, at 36.
121 SPIDR merged with the Academy of Family Mediators (AFM) and Conflict
Resolution Education Network (CRENet) to form the Association for Conflict
Resolution. See http://www.acresolution.orglresearch.nsf/articles/6B902FC81A6451BB
85256ACE00509A65 (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
122 DuNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at xiv.
123 Id. at xix.
124 Id. at 45.
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Task Force were careful to note that their assent to the Protocol reflected
their own personal views "and should not be construed as representing the
policy of the designating organizations."' 125
Although unanimous on the procedures that should be followed once
arbitration was initiated, the Task Force was unable to agree on the very
basic, but critical, issue: the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. In other
words, the Task Force failed to reach consensus on what might be described
as the heart of the issue: whether an employee could be required to agree, as
a condition of employment, to arbitrate his or her claims with the employer
prior to knowing the exact nature and substance of those claims. As stated by
the Task Force: "The Task Force takes no position on the timing of
agreements to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory employment disputes,
though it agrees that such agreements be knowingly made."' 126 The Task
Force's failure to reach consensus on this essential point will be discussed
below. 127
B. The Source of the Procedures in the Employment Protocol
It is abundantly clear that, at a minimum, practical necessity led to the
creation of the protocols. Given the Supreme Court's authorization of
arbitration for public employment law disputes and the legal systems' failure
to provide employees (and others) with meaningful access to justice, it was
clear that arbitration would play a much greater role in the resolution of
disputes between employers and employees. Moreover, given the employers'
desire to impose arbitration as a condition of employment, with terms that
were advantageous to the employer, the need to level the playing field was
apparent. The drafters of the Employment Protocol were well aware of the
existence of employer dispute resolution plans that "constituted inequitable
and oppressive efforts to tilt the result of such [arbitration] to the employer,
while depriving employees of many rights usually associated with due
process and fairness."' 128
Fair process is important not only to level the playing field between the
parties but also to achieve the values associated with the public laws subject
to arbitration. It is beyond dispute that the process by which substantive
rights are enforced can have an impact on those very rights. 129 If employees
125 Id. at 171.
126 Id. at 173.
127 See infra notes 447-450 and accompanying text.
128 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at xiii.
129 See, e.g., Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (In the Rules
Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 59 (1998) (discussing the
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were to benefit from the rights and remedies granted to them by the anti-
discrimination employment laws, the process by which those rights and
remedies were to be enforced needed to be tailored so that the policy goals
embodied in the substantive right were achieved.
With arbitration no longer the product of arms-length negotiation, where
both parties could bargain for a fair process that protects and preserves the
rights granted to each party from the laws subject to arbitration, 130 it was
clear that standards were needed to govern the arbitral process when the
arbitration agreement was presented to the employee on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. However, what those standards should be was not patently obvious.
Accordingly, the source of the procedures characterized as "due process" by
the drafters of the protocols will now be examined.
1. The Constitutional Dimension of Procedural Due Process
The characterization of the procedures as "due process" immediately
calls to mind the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, which prohibit the United States and state governments from
depriving a person of "life, liberty or property without due process of
law." 131 Although the "concept of procedural due process has never been
controversial," disputes have arisen regarding "what procedures should be
required" when a state or the federal government seeks to deprive a person of
life, liberty or property. 132 The Supreme Court has been unwilling to set forth
a uniform set of procedures that must be followed in all circumstances, 133
because "due process ... is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstance ... [but rather] is flexible and calls
impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on substantive outcomes); see also
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory
Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 231, 265-66 (1990) (discussing the impact of the
arbitration process on substantive rights); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 680 (1996) (noting that "[e]very litigator knows that procedural rules affect
substantive outcomes").
130 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes, DisP. RESOL. J.,
Aug. 1998, at 8, 10 ("In the traditional model of commercial arbitration, premised upon
arms-length negotiations between parties, the identity and qualifications of the arbitrators,
procedural due process, and arbitral discretion are all matters for bargaining. In other
words, it is generally up to the parties to define what is 'fair."').
131 U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1.
132 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 7.1, at
421 (1997).
133 Id. at § 7.4.2, at 451.
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for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 134
Although standard procedures have not been provided by the Court, the "core
elements of due process" entail "certain basic safeguards, such as notice of
the charges or issues, the opportunity for a meaningful hearing, and an
impartial decisionmaker."' 135
The literature regarding the creation of the Employment Protocol does
not tie the development of the specific standards to any constitutional
mandate or requirement, although at least one of the drafters recognized its
constitutional origins. 136 It is not surprising that a direct link is missing
inasmuch as "courts have consistently held that private arbitration lacks any
element of state action," 137 which is, with some exceptions, required for
134 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citations omitted)).
135 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at § 7.4.2, at 450.
To determine the procedures that should be followed when a person is deprived of
life, liberty or property, a court is to balance three factors:
the private interest that will be affected by the official action ... the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards... and the government's interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional procedures would
entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Due process has been found to require, at least in the case of termination of public
assistance benefits, an evidentiary hearing prior to termination with the right to confront
adverse witnesses, to present arguments and evidence orally, to have counsel present and
to have a decision by an impartial decisionmaker that is based solely on the evidence
presented at the hearing. See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 266-68, 270-71 (1970);
see also Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the
Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of
Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, at 4 (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Courts have defined [due process] to include notice, reasonable discovery of
relevant evidence, an opportunity to be heard, to confront and cross examine
witnesses, the right to counsel or a representative, an impartial hearing officer, a
record of the proceedings, and a reasoned decision explaining what evidence
persuaded the decisionmaker.
Bingham & Sarraf, supra, at 4.
136 See DuNLop & ZACK, supra note 1, at 117 ("Formulation of due process
standards is not done lightly or quickly. It has taken our legal institutions since the Magna
Carta to develop the standards of due process and legal fairness to which we believe all
citizens should be entitled.").
137 Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1468
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (1lth Cir.
1995)).
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application of constitutional prohibitions to particular conduct. 13s
Accordingly, under the state action doctrine, private arbitration would not
have to comport with the requirements of procedural due process found in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 139
While it is arguable that the Constitution may not have required the
imposition of due process protections, it is entirely possible that the drafters
of the Protocol believed that the substantive public laws, subject to
arbitration since Mitsubishi, required that disputes brought pursuant to their
provisions in an arbitral forum be given due process protections. 140 Such a
finding is consistent with the Supreme Court's belief that the deterrent and
remedial purposes of public laws will be served "so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum," 141 and its finding that process can indeed impact upon substantive
rights. 142 Other commentators have determined that the FAA itself requires
that the process of arbitration be a fair one, requiring the implementation of
due process minimums. 143
138 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, § 6.4.1.
139 Legal scholars have argued that state action is in fact implicated by private
arbitration. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 590 (1997) (arguing that "the
history and operation of the statutory schemes delegating the government's traditionally
exclusive role in legally binding dispute resolution to seemingly private parties, and the
intense entanglement of public courts in that delegation, often establish state action that
must trigger constitutional protections .... ); Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.
REv. 1, 40-47 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's preference for binding
arbitration constitutes state action).
140 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the
Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 96 (1996):
[K]ey to the [Gilmer] Court's analysis-that compelled arbitration was consistent
with the ADEA's policies-was its view that enforcement of the arbitration
agreement did not vitiate Gilmer's ADEA claim but merely changed the forum in
which he was to seek vindication. That rationale dissipates if the arbitral forum does
not meet minimum standards of procedural justice.
See also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C.Cir. 1997).
141 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985). See, e.g., Suzan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y. J. 221, 234 (1997) ("Effective vindication of a statutory right in arbitration
assumes a fair arbitral process .... ) (citation omitted).
142 See, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
143 See, e.g., Maltby, supra note 14, at 16.
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Whatever the "legal" source, it is abundantly clear that the imposition of
due process standards was considered essential by Mr. Zack, the initiator of
the Employment Protocol, if arbitration was to be a substitute, or a
"reasonable equivalent," for the judicial and administrative models that had
failed employees.144 Those models, although inaccessible to employees, had
created an expectation and a standard of fairness by which employees and
others would judge the fairness of the alternative system. 145 The credibility
of the system would also be impacted by society's view of the fairness of its
processes. Fairness of process implicated due process protections.
2. Labor Arbitration Model
Although not directly tied to a constitutional mandate, it is clear that the
protocols embody many of the "core principles" of due process. These
protections were familiar to some of the drafters of the Employment Protocol
because they are present in labor arbitration, and the drafters of the
Employment Protocol, particularly Mr. Zack, had extensive experience in
labor arbitration. Through the process of negotiation between labor unions
and management, typical labor arbitration, it is asserted, contains
"most... [due process] safeguards .... "146 Accordingly, the due process
aspects of union-management arbitration served as a model for the creation
of the Employment Protocol.147 That model was used because grievance
arbitration "[met] many of the requirements of effective dispute resolution
system design," and "achieved such a high degree of confidence" that it
enjoys "strong judicial endorsement." 148
144 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at 93, 95.
145 Id. at 93.
146 Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 135, at 5; see also FitzGibbon, supra, note 141, at
224 ("[L]abor arbitration involves time-tested procedures and due process safeguards.");
Maltby, supra note 14, at 11 (discussing the "established safeguards" in labor arbitration
to "protect against procedural improprieties and... ensure a just result"); Julius G.
Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 916 (1979)
(arguing that when labor arbitration functions properly, it achieves, among other things,
the goal of fairness).
147 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at 36 (authors assert that the "standards of
fairness and due process" present in labor arbitration "should be worthy of general
adoption if arbitration in the employment law arena is to treat employees and employers
fairly and to bring greater equity to the resolution of workplace disputes").
148 FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 85, at 115; see also FitzGibbon, supra note
141, at 222 ("In 1960 the U.S. Supreme Court significantly endorsed labor arbitration as
practically an essential part of collective bargaining .... ).
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Recognizing that non-union employees have no bargaining power to
negotiate the terms of the arbitration clause with employers, the drafters of
the Employment Protocol believed that "adoption of the due process
standards from the collective bargaining environment would alleviate to
some degree the imbalance between [the] employer and individual
employee."1 49 Although such standards are not a "panacea for resolving all
disputes outside the collective bargaining context," they "do set forth
standards for fair treatment" that are "the result of decades of collective
bargaining and arbitration decisions.' 150 Although those standards provided
the blueprint for the Employment Protocol, some modifications were made
based on the unique nature of arbitration of statutory claims in the non-union
environment. 151
Adoption of labor arbitration's "time-tested" procedural safeguards
addressed the drafters' additional concern that without adherence to those
procedures, non-union arbitration would be discredited, which, in turn, would
tarnish the otherwise good image of labor arbitration. As stated by Mr. Zack:
Gilmer raised the prospect of employers structuring unfair forums invoking
the name of arbitration without the due process protections, which had been
so carefully nurtured in 50 years of collective bargaining arbitration. As
then-President of the National Academy of Arbitrators, I was particularly
concerned about the impact this might have on the reputation of labor
management arbitrators. 152
Accordingly, imposition of due process standards was necessary, not only to
protect employees required to arbitrate their claims of discrimination against
their employers, but also to protect and preserve the reputation of arbitration,
generally, and labor arbitration, specifically.
149 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at 26.
150 Id. at 36.
151 Prior to the adoption of the Employment Protocol, some commentators believed
that the differences between grievance arbitration and public law arbitration were
significant enough that the "format and procedures" of grievance arbitration should not
be "mechanically transferred to public law arbitration." Gorman, supra note 14, at 639;
see also Getman, supra note 146, at 917, 934-35 (discussing the application of labor
arbitration to non-unionized employment and finding formidable obstacles to such
application, due in part, to the "idiosyncratic nature of labor arbitration and its crucial
interrelationship with unionization and collective bargaining").




3. "The Luster of the Legal Process Radiates the Promise of
Justice "153
The Task Force was wise to focus on the fairness of the process to help
arbitration of public law disputes in the non-union context gain legitimacy
and credibility, which would further its goal of providing average employees
access to justice. Studies have shown that a claimant's satisfaction with a
dispute resolution system is primarily influenced by his or her perception of
the procedural fairness of the system. 154 While fairness of outcome and
"winning" were important to litigants, such concerns were not as important
as the "process by which their case [was] ... handled." 155 Satisfaction with
the process had an impact on the litigant's intention to comply with a ruling,
and with his or her general willingness to follow the law in his or her
everyday life. 156 Judgments about the fairness of the process influenced a
litigant's evaluation of the "third parties with whom they deal ... the court
system and the law."' 157
Infusing arbitration with due process protections undeniably will
influence the public's perception of the process. Indeed, the drafters hoped
that by "specifying clear and stringent quality standards for arbitration," the
Employment Protocol would help "overcome[] the high level of skepticism
and criticism" associated with some arbitration arrangements. 158 Instead of
viewing arbitration as a one-sided process that inures solely to the benefit of
153 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrrHoUT LAW?, at vii (1983).
154 Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 883-85 (1997). Cf
Ackerman, supra note 83, at 37 ("Even when private processes, such as mediation and
arbitration, are employed, parties are likely to emerge most satisfied when they have been
given 'voice' (i.e. when they have been sufficiently heard), and when they have been
treated as fully enfranchised members of the community."). According to Professor
Haydock, what consumers, employees, and others want in a dispute resolution system:
reflect[s] the basic elements of a fair hearing: (1) speed-reasonably prompt, (2) cost-
affordable and proportional, (3) an accessible proceeding comporting with "due process"
standards, (4) a wise, impartial decision maker-who knows the applicable law, and (5) a
predictable decision based on the facts and law-and not a compromise or "split the
baby" decision.
Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century:
Mediation and Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 745, 747
(2000).
155 Tyler, supra note 154, at 882 (citations omitted).
156 Id. at 883-85.
157 Id. at 884.
158 Thomas A. Kochan, Using the Dunlop Report to Achieve Mutual Gains, 34
INDUS. REL. 350, 358 (1995).
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the party who insisted on the clause, the process may be viewed for the
benefits it provides to the claimant, the most important of which may be that
it is an accessible process in which to seek redress for an employer's
violation of the anti-discrimination laws. 159 Most importantly, as will be
shown below, all the protocols provide claimants with what they want most
in a dispute resolution process: the opportunity to "tell their side of the
story." 160
The Task Force's appreciation of the importance of and need for fair
process in the arbitral hearing reflects society's belief, or blinders, as some
might assert, that process promises justice. 161 Indeed, one of the justifications
for procedural due process is its perceived ability to "enhanc[e] accuracy."1 62
Legal process, however, has a "dark[] side ... [i]t can be threatening,
inaccessible and exorbitant," particularly "for the least powerful people in
society."1 63 Moreover, some commentators have recognized that not all
procedures that currently make up our legal process are essential to ensure
fairness or accuracy: "Surely there is a good deal of tosh-that is,
superfluous rituals, rules of procedure without clear purpose, needless
precautions preserved through habit-in the adjudicative process as we
observe it in this country."' 164
159 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (detailing how concerns over the
inaccessibility of the judicial system led, in part, to the creation of the Employment
Protocol).
160 Tyler, supra note 154, at 883.
161 AUERBACH, supra note 153, at 3. It should be noted that "arbitration shares many
of the characteristics of traditional courtroom litigation." Ackerman, supra note 83, at 67;
see also Getman, supra note 146, at 931-32 ("Arbitration has no unique procedural
aspects and the... process[] [of arbitration and adjudication] are frequently
indistinguishable."). Accordingly, that closeness may create expectations on the part of
disputants that the arbitral process will contain many of the same procedures that would
be available in the judicial forum.
162 Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 28, 48 (1976) (criticizing the Supreme Court for too
narrowly perceiving the value of procedure as a means to enhance accuracy in
decisionmaking).
163 AUERBACH, supra note 153, at vii.
164 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,
356 (1978); see also Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation
Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1648 (1985) (arguing that some procedural rules may not be
worthwhile given the slight chance that they will promote fairness).
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In determining which procedures were necessary to ensure fairness 165
and accuracy, two of the values sought to be furthered by procedural due
process, the drafters were sensitive to the notion that those procedures not
convert the arbitral process into the judicial process. Arbitration was viewed
as a mechanism for alleviating the "dark side" of litigation in a judicial
forum, particularly as it impacted low-wage employees. If arbitration was to
gain standing, it had to transcend those problems. Thus, the drafters of the
protocols walked a fine line in separating the "tosh" from the "essential" to
ensure a fundamentally fair process to all parties in the arbitration and to gain
the public's trust and faith in arbitration as a "substitute for the courts." 166
C. The Employment Protocol
The procedures detailed in the Employment Protocol closely follow those
procedures the Commission outlined in its Final Report. It provides that
employees should have the right to be represented by "a spokesperson of
their own choosing" at the arbitration, 167 and should have the right to limited
discovery, including "all information reasonably relevant" to the employee's
claim. 168
With respect to arbitrator selection and qualifications, the Employment
Protocol provides that the parties should be able to contact the
representatives of the disputants in the last six cases handled by the proposed
arbitrator. 169 In addition, the arbitrators should be qualified to handle
employment discrimination cases: "arbitrators selected for such cases should
165 "In the realm of adjudicatory procedure, a widely recognized aspect of
procedural fairness is equality of opportunity to be heard." Mashaw, supra note 162, at
52.
166 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at 72.
167 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 173. The Employment Protocol goes on
to recommend a system where the employer reimburse the employee for "at least a
portion of the employee's attorney fees, especially for lower paid employees." Id. It also
provides that the arbitrator have the authority to award attorney fees as part of the
employee's remedy "in accordance with applicable law or in the interests of justice." Id.
168 Discovery can include pre-hearing depositions. Id.
169 Id. at 174; see infra note 445 and accompanying text (concerning the adequacy
of this provision).
With respect to the mechanics of selecting an arbitrator, the Employment Protocol
recommends that the arbitration service provider (called the designating agency) "utilize
a list procedure," if the parties request or "select a panel composed of an odd number
of... arbitrators from its roster or pool." Id. at 175, 176. Parties should also be given
information about the arbitrators prior to making their selection. In the event that the
parties do not want to utilize the striking procedure or if it is unsuccessful, the "selection
process could empower the designating agency to appoint a[n] ... arbitrator." Id.
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have skill in the conduct of hearings, knowledge of the statutory issues at
stake in the dispute, and familiarity with the workplace and employment
environment." 170 The roster of arbitrators "should be established on a non-
discriminatory basis, diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, and
experience." 171  The drafters of the Employment Protocol further
recommended the selection of "impartial arbitrators," who are "independent
of bias toward either party." 172 In that connection, the Employment Protocol
requires that arbitrators disclose any real or perceived conflicts of interest
and that they be required to "sign an oath... affirming the absence of such
present or existing ties" to the parties.1 73
The arbitrators are also required to follow "applicable agreements,
statutes, regulations and rules of procedure of the designating agency."' 174
That authority includes the ability to "determine the time and place of the
hearing, permit reasonable discovery, issue subpoenas, decide arbitrability
issues, preserve order and privacy in the hearings, rule on evidentiary
matters, determine the close of the hearing and procedures for post-hearing
submissions, and issue an award resolving the submitted dispute."'175 In
making the award, the "arbitrator should be empowered to award whatever
relief would be available in court under the law," 176 and the arbitrator
"should issue an opinion and award setting forth a summary of the
issues .... -177 which should be "final and binding" and subject to limited
review. 178
Finally, with respect to costs, the Employment Protocol states that
"[i]mpartiality is best assured by the parties sharing the fees and expenses of
170 Id. at 174.
171 Id. The drafters recognized that "[t]he existing cadre of labor and
employment ... arbitrators" may not possess all of the qualifications needed to hear
discrimination cases, particularly with respect to "knowledge of the statutory
environment" and the "characteristics of the non-union workplace." Id. In that
connection, the drafters recommended the development of training programs. Id. at 175.
172 Id. at 174-75.
173 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 176.
1 7 4 
Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. This is a significant provision inasmuch as arbitration clauses have been used
to restrict the arbitrators' power to award specific kinds of relief otherwise available
under statutory law. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 1112 (2002); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F.
Supp.2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998), affd. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Graham Oil Co. v.
ARCO Prod.Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1995).
177 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 176.
178 Id. at 177.
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the... arbitrator."' 179 However, it recognizes that "the economic condition of
a party" may require a different approach to cost sharing. If that is the case,
the Employment Protocol instructs the parties to "make mutually acceptable
arrangements to achieve" the goal of equal sharing.' 80 If unable, the
arbitrator is given the authority to determine allocation of fees. 8 1
Each of the provisions of the Employment Protocol were designed to
help create a level procedural playing field between the disputants and to
give disputants an equal opportunity to be heard. In addition, the Employment
Protocol sought to restrain certain attempts by the drafter of the clause to
gain an advantage in the process, by either unilaterally selecting the
arbitrator, restricting the remedies available to a claimant, imposing the full
cost of the process on the claimant, restraining the claimant's ability to prove
his or her case by restricting access to information, or by depriving the
claimant of the right to be represented at the arbitration. Indeed, the
Employment Protocol instructs arbitrators to reject cases if "the procedure
lacks requisite due process."' 182 It also imposes upon arbitrators and
arbitration service providers the obligation to obtain proper training to handle
statutory employment disputes.
D. The Impact of the Employment Protocol on Arbitration Law and
Practice
The Employment Protocol has had a far-reaching impact. Not only has it
provided employees with a more balanced process when required to arbitrate
a controversy with an employer, it has also acted as the blueprint for the
development of due process protocols for consumers and those involved in
health care disputes. In addition, the Employment Protocol has been used to
provide guidance to federal and state agencies creating arbitration programs
and to the courts when attempting to determine the enforceability of a
particular arbitration clause. Federal lawmakers have also looked to it for
guidance in various attempts to amend the FAA.
1. Adoption of the Protocol by Arbitration Service Providers and
Others
After the Employment Protocol was completed, the drafters made an




182 Id. at 175.
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process standards. 183 The Employment Protocol was endorsed by, among
others, the NAA, the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section, and the
National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA). 184
One of the most, if not the most, significant effects of the creation of the
Employment Protocol to individual employees was the adoption of its
principles and standards by major arbitration service providers. The role of
the providers cannot be underestimated: "The vast majority of arbitrations
conducted both domestically and internationally are 'sponsored' in some way
by 'provider' organizations."' 85 These organizations are generally designated
in the arbitration agreement as the entity that will provide arbitration services
in connection with the dispute. Those services can range from administering
the arbitration and supplying lists of arbitrators to, "in the most active forms
of management, review [of] arbitral awards and full[] supervi[sion] [of] the
process."' 186 Indeed, one commentator has opined: "The future of privatized
justice depends upon the integrity of administering institutions and the
quality of their response to key procedural and remedial issues." 187 As will
183 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at xix.
184 Dispute Resolution: ABA Committee Debates Guidelines for Arbitrating
Statutory Rights Disputes, 153 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C3 (Aug. 9, 1995). Interestingly,
SPIDR, who had a representative on the Dispute Resolution Task Force, did not endorse
the Employment Protocol. Id.
Although the NAA endorsed the Employment Protocol, it did not approve of the use
of mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment. In May 1997, at its fiftieth annual
meeting, the NAA issued a statement opposing "mandatory employment arbitration as a
condition of employment when it requires waiver of direct access to either a judicial or
administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights." See
http://www.naarb.org/guidelines.html#Statement (last visited Sept. 26, 2003). However,
the NAA declined to prohibit its members from serving as arbitrators in such cases. In
that regard, "members should consider and evaluate the fairness of any employment
arbitration procedures in light of the Academy's 'Guidelines on Arbitration of Statutory
Claims Under Employer-Promulgated Systems."' Id. Those guidelines "provide an
outline of practical, procedural, and evidentiary questions of application that the
arbitrator might encounter in deciding whether to hear these cases and, if so, how they
might be resolved." Id. Significantly, the guidelines tell arbitrators that withdrawal from
an arbitration that does not comply with fundamental due process "carries considerable
moral suasion." Id.; see also FitzGibbon, supra note 141, at 222 (explaining why
statement of NAA was "understandable").
185 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute
Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 965
(2002). But see infra note 308 and accompanying text (regarding arbitration of consumer
claims).
186 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 965.
187 Stipanowich, supra note 130, at 13.
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be discussed below, 188 in recognition of the important role these provider
organizations play in the administration of private justice, the CPR-
Georgetown Commission of Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR
promulgated guidelines for providers of ADR services which were "designed
to suggest 'best practices' and 'baseline measures' in the provision of
arbitration and (other ADR) services." 189
Thus, perhaps in recognition of the "salient role" they play in the
provision of private justice, 190 the AAA 19 1 and the Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services, Inc., (JAMS) 192 both endorsed the Employment Protocol
and revised their arbitration rules to reflect its principles. 193 In that
connection, both organizations indicated that they would decline to
administer arbitration if the arbitration agreement did not comply with those
188 See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
189 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 965-667.
190 Stipanowich, supra note 130, at 13.
191 The AAA, a non-profit organization, is the "nation's largest full-service ADR
provider." A Brief Overview of the American Arbitration Association, at
http:www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15765 (last visited Oct. 13, 2003). In 2002, it
administered 230,255 cases. Id. It has resolved workplace disputes for "nearly 700
corporations and 6 million employees." Id.
192 JAMS is a for-profit provider that was founded in 1979. In July 1999, "a group
of 45 neutrals and managers purchased the company from institutional investors ......
See http://www.jamsadr.com/who we-are.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
193 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at xiv, 89; see also JAMS/Endispute Issues
Minimum Standards for Employment Arbitration, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 50,
50 (1995); Arbitration: Revised AAA Arbitration Procedures Reflect Due Process Task
Force Scheme, 102 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) AI (May 28, 1996); Green, supra note 16, at
426.
The significance of this event should not be overlooked. Endorsement of the
Employment Protocol meant that these providers would no longer administer
employment arbitrations according to the terms and conditions set forth in the arbitration
agreement only, but rather according to the mandates of the protocol. If a conflict arose
between the terms of the agreement and the protocol, the providers were bound to follow
the protocol.
Adoption of the Employment Protocol provided the AAA and JAMS a basis upon
which to justify their continued practice of accepting mandatory arbitration claims in the
wake of a threatened boycott of their services by members of NELA because of such
practice. See Arbitration: ADR Services Will Maintain Practice of Hearing Compulsory
Arbitration Cases, 214 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A4 (Nov. 6, 1995); see also Richard C.
Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 58, 58-59
("[due process protocols] largely languished until NELA issued an ultimatum to AAA
and JAMS .... ); Green, supra note 16, at 426 (discussing boycott); Green, supra note
55, at 221 (same); FitzGibbon, supra note 141, at 226-227 (same).
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rules. 194 By endorsing and adopting the Employment Protocol, these
arbitration service providers ceased their practice of administering any
employer-promulgated arbitration agreement presented to them. 195 By
agreeing to administer only employment arbitrations that were in compliance
with the Employment Protocol, employees, whose employers sought to use
the services of the AAA or JAMS, were, for the first time, protected, to some
degree, from certain aspects of one-sided arbitration clauses. Other
arbitration service-providers undertook similar steps. 19 6
194 Although the AAA endorsed the Employment Protocol in 1995, concerns were
raised by Mr. Zack in February 1996 that the AAA continued to administer programs that
were not in compliance with it. See Arbitration: Labor Lawyers at ABA Session Debate
Role of American Arbitration Association, 31 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) All (Feb. 15,
1996).
195 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at 166.
196 In its Arbitration Bill of Rights, the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF'), "one
of the world's largest neutral administrators of arbitration services" sets forth twelve
principles for the conduct of an arbitration, including the right to a "fundamentally fair
process." See http://www.arbitration-forum.com/arbitration/questions.asp#1 (last visited
Sept. 26, 2003). The NAF "will not administer arbitration under contracts that do not
meet these principles." National Arbitration Forum, Arbitration Bill of Rights, at
http://www.arbitration-forum.com/articles/pdfs/bor_12-31-02.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2003); see also Carroll E. Neesemann, Should An Arbitration Provision Trump the Class
Action? Yes: Permitting Courts to Strike Bar on Class Actions in Otherwise Clean Clause
Would Discourage Use of Arbitration, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 13, 16
(discussing due process standards of NAF, JAMS, and AAA).
The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, a nonprofit "initiative of 500 general
counsel of major corporations, leading law firms, and prominent legal academics in
support of private alternatives to the high costs of litigation," has adopted the
Employment Dispute Arbitration Procedures which the CPR maintains are consistent
with the Employment Protocol. See http://www.cpradr.org. (last visited Sept. 26, 2003);
see also Green, supra note 55, at 211 n. 257.
The NASD, like the NYSE ceased its practice of requiring employees to arbitrate
statutory employment claims against their employers as a condition of registering with it,
although it did not bar employers from mandating arbitration of such claims. See supra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text; Self-Regulatory Organizations; National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40109, 67 S.E.C. Docket 824 (June 22, 1998); see also Arbitration:
Proposed Change in NASD's Policy on Arbitration Gets Mixed Reactions, 167 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) C1 (Aug. 28, 1997); NASD to Eliminate Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Discrimination Claims, 11 NASD REGULATORY & COMPLIANCE ALERT 1, 4
(Sept 1997).
Since the NASD eliminated that requirement, it has also made changes to its own
rules governing the arbitration of employment statutory disputes that reflect the principles
embodied in the Employment Protocol. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing
of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 by the National Association of
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The Employment Protocol also got the attention of certain state and
federal agencies. 197 For example, in 1996, the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination developed an arbitration program using the AAA,
which agreed to use rules and procedures consistent with the Employment
Protocol. 198 The United States Labor Department gave notice that it intended
to implement pilot projects using, among other things, arbitration in certain
categories of cases and promised that such arbitration would contain fair
procedures. The Employment Protocol was cited as a document that was
reviewed in connection with creation of the pilot project. 199
2. Development of the Consumer and Health Care Protocols
The Employment Protocol served as a model for the Consumer
Protocol20 0 and the Health Care Protocol.20 1 As will be seen below, those
protocols expand and further refine many of the principles set forth in the
Employment Protocol.
Creation of the Consumer Protocol came at the instigation of the
AAA. 20 2 In 1997, a National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee was
convened by the AAA with representatives from consumer groups, providers
of goods and services, state and federal agencies and academic
institutions. 20 3 This committee's role was to "advise the [AAA] in the
development of standards and procedures for the equitable resolution of
consumer disputes." 204 In addition to its advisory role to the AAA, the
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process for Claims of Employment
Discrimination, Exchange Act Release No. 34-41461, 69 S.E.C. Docket 2039 (May 27,
1999). The proposed rule was approved by the SEC. See Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process for Claims of Employment
Discrimination, No. 34-42061, 70 S.E.C. Docket 2341 (Oct. 27, 1998).
197 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 1, at xix (efforts to gamer interest in Employment
Protocol had a "state and a federal focus").
198 Id. at 145.
199 See Labor Department Notice on Expanding Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 29 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E17, E18 (Feb. 12, 1997).
200 Consumer Protocol, supra note 2.
201 Health Care Protocol, supra note 2.
202 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 896 n.383 (noting that although the AAA initiated
the effort, its "representatives did not play an active role in the Committee's deliberations
or drafting process"). Professor Stipanowich was a principal drafter of the protocol and
its academic reporter. See Stipanowich, supra note 130, at 9.
203 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 896.
204 Consumer Protocol, supra note 2, at Introduction: Genesis of the Advisory
Committee.
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Advisory Committee hoped that the standards it created would have a more
broad reaching effect, influencing, among other things, "the evolution of
consumer rules generally and the development of state and federal laws
governing consumer arbitration agreements." 205 The Advisory Committee
also hoped the standards would influence judicial opinions regarding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. 20 6
The Consumer Protocol, signed in April 1998,207 contains fifteen
principles relating to alternative dispute resolution processes for consumer
claims. 20 8 Like the Employment Protocol, the Consumer Protocol does not
prohibit the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses, although it
exempts from coverage of a mandatory arbitration clause disputes that would
fall within the jurisdiction of a small claims court.20 9 Unlike the Employment
Protocol, the Consumer Protocol explicitly requires that the ADR program
be independent of the parties. 210
The Consumer Protocol specifically addresses the issue regarding
contract formation, which is aimed at insuring that the arbitration agreement
is the product of "knowing, informed assent." 211 It has gone further than the
Employment Protocol in this respect by requiring not only that consumers be
given "clear and adequate notice of the arbitration provision and its
consequences" 212 but also access to information regarding the arbitration
process, including information about the differences between the arbitration
process and the court process, and the cost of such process.213 Practical
suggestions are provided throughout the Consumer Protocol to facilitate the
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. The Consumer Protocol makes it clear that it reflects the personal views of
the signatories and "should not be construed as representing the policy of the designating
organizations." Id. at List of Signatories.
208 Id. at Statement of Principles.
209 Id. at Scope of the Consumer Due Process Protocol; Principle 5: Small Claims.
210 Consumer Protocol, supra note 2, at Principle 3: Independent and Impartial
Neutral; Independent Administration. The Health Care Protocol also demands
independence. Health Care Protocol, supra note 2, at Principle 4: Neutrality and
Independence.
211 Consumer Protocol, supra note 2, at Principle 11: Agreements to Arbitrate,
Reporter's Comments.
212 Id.
213 Id. at Principle 2: Access to Information Regarding ADR Program, Reporter's
Comments. Although the Employment Protocol only states that the agreement to arbitrate
statutory employment claims be "knowingly made," it does not provide any standards or
guidelines to determine whether an employee knowingly agreed to arbitrate. Employment
Protocol, supra note 1, at 173.
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implementation of the various principles and the reporter has provided
comments that give insight into the rationale of the Advisory Committee with
respect to each principle.
As expected, the Consumer Protocol "directly influenc[ed]" the
consumer procedures used by the AAA. 214 The AAA adopted the Consumer
Protocol "as the essential guidepost for the Association's participation in
consumer ADR programs," and it will decline to administer cases under a
program that "substantially and materially deviates" from the standards set
forth in the Consumer Protocol. 215 The Consumer Protocol may also have
influenced adoption of consumer due process standards by other arbitration
service providers.216
The Consumer Protocol was "closely followed" in the Health Care
Protocol.2 17 That protocol was created by the Commission on Health Care
Dispute Resolution. 218 That Commission was formed at a time when serious
questions were raised about the appropriateness of using arbitration for the
resolution of health care disputes,2 19 and, as noted by its Secretary and
Rapporteur, its recommendations came at a time when "the topic of health
care [had] become a subject of national discourse." 220
The Commission was made up of "the leading associations involved in
alternative dispute resolution, law and medicine" (i.e., the ABA, the AAA,
and the American Medical Association (AMA)). 221 The goal of the
214 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 908 (citing the AAA Arbitration Rules for the
Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes).
215 Stipanowich, supra note 130, at 13.
216 Id. (citing NAF's Consumer Due Process Standard Statement of Principles
(2000)); see also JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute
Clauses; Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, at http://www.jamsadr.com/
consumer _arb std.asp. (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
217 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 908. The Employment Protocol also influenced the
Health Care Protocol. Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution, Final Report
(July 27, 1998), at 14 (hereinafter, "Health Care Dispute Resolution Report") (on file
with author).
218 Health Care Dispute Resolution Report, supra note 217, at 1.
219 Journalist Margaret Jacobs noted that the Commission was formed after the
California Supreme Court had criticized Kaiser Permanente's administration of its
mandatory arbitration program. Margaret A. Jacobs, American Arbitration Association to
Change Policy on Health Care, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1998, at B5; see infra note 303 and
accompanying text.
220 George H. Friedman, Recommendations for Health Care Dispute Resolution, 10
MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 1 (1998).
221 Health Care Dispute Resolution Report, supra note 217, at 3-4. There were 15
persons on the Commission; each of the institutions had four representatives. The
407
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Commission was to determine whether and under what circumstances
alternative dispute resolution could be used to resolve disputes arising in
privately managed health care. The Commission stated its mission as
follows: "to evaluate and make recommendations as to how alternative
dispute resolution should be used to provide a just, prompt and economical
means of resolving disputes over access to health care treatment, and
coverage in the private health plan/managed-care environment. '222
After a year of study and investigation, where the Commission heard
from numerous organizations and individuals, 223  the Commission
recommended, among other things, that ADR be used to resolve disputes
involving issues of health care coverage and access when those disputes were
between patients and health care providers and private care plans and
managed care organizations. If ADR was to be used, the Commission
recommended that due process protections consistent with the Health Care
Protocol be provided to all involved in an ADR process.
The Health Care Protocol contains ten principles regarding the use of
ADR processes, which, like its predecessor protocols, provide minimum
standards of due process for the use of ADR processes. 224 Unlike the Task
Force that drafted the Employment Protocol, and the Advisory Committee
that drafted the Consumer Protocol, the Commission on Health Care Dispute
Resolution was able to reach a resolution regarding the permissibility of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. In disputes involving patients, the Health
Care Protocol permits the use of binding arbitration only if the parties agree
to it after the dispute arises.225 Accordingly, the Health Care Protocol was
the only protocol to ban the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
agreements when a patient was involved.
president of the ABA, the president and chief executive officer of the AAA, and the
president of the AMA co-chaired the Commission. Id. at 4.
222 Health Care Dispute Resolution Report, supra note 217, at 4-5.
223 The Commission heard from "heath care providers, patient advocacy groups,
health care insurers, health insurance associations, public health officials, elder care
groups and law and medical school faculty." Friedman, supra note 220, at 2.
224 The 10 principles address the following: fundamentally fair process, access to
information regarding ADR program, knowing and voluntary agreement to use ADR,
neutrality and independence of neutral and administrating body, quality and competence
of neutrals, right to representation, conduct of ADR hearings, reasonable time limits,
rules governing settlement agreements in mediation or awards in arbitration, and costs.
Health Care Protocol, supra note 2.
225 Id. at Principle 3:Knowing and Voluntary Agreement to Use ADR.
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The ABA adopted the Health Care Protocol,226 and the AAA has now
finally taken an official position regarding its adherence to the Health Care
Protocol and has indicated that it will no longer administer cases involving
patients unless the agreement to arbitrate is entered post-dispute. 227
3. Guidance to the Courts Regarding Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements
Parties and courts have used the protocols in various ways when the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate is at issue. The use of the
protocols by advocates and the courts' recognition of them demonstrate that,
at a minimum, the protocols have influenced, to some degree, both the
manner in which arbitration agreements are evaluated and the development
of the common law regarding the conditions that must be met for a court to
compel arbitration. 228
One of the first courts to discuss the Employment Protocol was the D.C.
Circuit in Cole v. Burns International Security Services.229 There, the court
enforced an arbitration agreement requiring an employee to arbitrate his Title
VII claim pursuant to the rules of the AAA.230 The agreement was
enforceable only because the court found that it satisfied certain safeguards
that were necessary for the employee to adequately vindicate his statutory
rights. 231 The court found support for its assertion that certain safeguards
were needed when arbitration is imposed as a condition of employment in,
among other things, the findings of the Dunlop Commission 232 and the
Employment Protocol.233
226 See William K. Slate II, ADR and the Health Care Challenge, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Aug. 1999, at 1 (1999) (noting that the ABA's policy-making body endorsed the Health
Care Protocol).
227 See http://www.adr.org/index2.l.jsp?JSPssid=15728. The AAA's policy was
effective as of January 1, 2003. It is curious that the AAA did not institute this policy
change earlier. An article published by the Wall Street Journal in 1998 indicated that the
AAA was "expected to announce that it will change its policy and refuse to administer
mandatory arbitrations of patients' health-care disputes." Jacobs, supra note 219, at B5.
228 One of the stated purposes of the Consumer Protocol is to "influence judicial
opinions addressing the enforceability of arbitration agreements pursuant to existing state
or federal law." Consumer Protocol, supra note 2, at Introduction: Genesis of the
Advisory Committee.
229 Cole v. Bums Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 n.l I (D.C. Cir. 1997).
230 Id. at 1482-83.
231 Id.
232 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
233 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483 n.1 1.
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However, the court parted company with the Employment Protocol with
respect to one particular standard, the allocation of the arbitrator's fee.2 34 The
court indicated that it would only uphold the agreement to arbitrate because it
could be interpreted as requiring the employer to bear the full burden of the
arbitrator's fee.235 As stated, because of its concern regarding impartiality,
the Employment Protocol provides that the parties share those fees. 236 The
court rejected that justification for requiring cost sharing: "If an arbitrator is
likely to 'lean' in favor of an employer.., it would be because the employer
is a source of future arbitration business ... and not because the employer
alone pays the arbitrator." 237 The court's development of a standard stricter
than that contained in the Employment Protocol suggests that the
Employment Protocol may be, as one of its drafter's articulated, a "first step"
in the evolution of due process standards for the conduct of arbitration
proceedings involving public statutory rights. 238
An arbitration agreement that did not comply with the standards
articulated in the Employment Protocol was found to be unconscionable and
a violation of public policy in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips.2 39 There,
plaintiff offered affidavits of arbitration experts that, among other things,
compared the rules of the arbitration scheme that plaintiff Was required to
follow to the standards contained in the Employment Protocol and in the
rules of certain arbitration service providers. 240 That comparison led those
experts to conclude that they would refuse to arbitrate the discrimination
claim under the rules applicable -in plaintiffs arbitration agreement. 241
Although the court did not specifically hold that Hooters' arbitration rules
were void simply because they failed to comply with the Employment
Protocol, the standards set forth in the Employment Protocol provided a
234 Id. at 1485-86.
235 Id.
236 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 177; see also supra notes 179-81 and
accompanying text (regarding the Employment Protocol's treatment of fees if one party is
economically unable to equally share the fees).
237 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485.
238 Arbitration: Academy Board Endorses ADR Task Force Prototype, 104 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) A-5 (May 31, 1995) ("Zack called the work of the ADR task force a
first step in pointing the way to a more reasonable and equitable system.").
239 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F.Supp.2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998), affd. 173 F.3d
933 (4th Cir. 1999).




benchmark for the court in determining the appropriate rules for the conduct
of an arbitration. 242
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, also noted the utility of the protocols, and the
rules enacted by the providers to effectuate the principles set forth in the
protocols, as guides to the industry standards. 243 There, a purchaser of a
mobile home signed a Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract and
Security Agreement which required arbitration of "all disputes, claims or
controversies arising from or relating to this Contract .... -244 In response to
Randolph's class action alleging that Green Tree had violated the Truth in
Lending Act, Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration agreement. 245 Randolph asserted that she lacked the financial
resources to arbitrate.246 The arbitration agreement was silent as to how the
costs of arbitration were to be allocated between the parties. 247 As will be
recalled,248 the Supreme Court held that that silence alone was not reason
enough to make the arbitration agreement unenforceable. 249 Because the
record did not demonstrate what the costs would be, the Court found that Ms.
Randolph failed to meet her burden of proving the likelihood that the costs of
arbitration would be prohibitively high.250
Justice Ginsburg believed that the drafter of the agreement could have
filled in the gap regarding the cost of arbitration, by providing that the
arbitration would be conducted in accordance with the rules of an arbitration
242 The district court in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998), affd., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999), also used the
Employment Protocol as a basis upon which to judge the fairness and independence of
the NYSE arbitration system. Unlike the Employment Protocol which "mandate[d]
appointment procedures that give each party scrupulously equal rights in the process [of
arbitrator selection]," the NYSE arbitral system lacked independence and was dominated
by the NYSE itself, an organization to which the defendant belonged." Id. at 208, 212. In
its affirmation, the First Circuit expressly "disavowed" the district court's conclusion that
the agreement was not enforceable because of structural bias in the NYSE forum.
Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 4.
243 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 95 (2000) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
244 Id. at 83 n.1.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 83-84.
247 Id. at 89.
248 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
249 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91.
250 Id. at 90-91.
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service provider.251 Citing, among other things, the Consumer Protocol,
Justice Ginsburg noted that other national arbitration organizations had
developed similar rules mandating fair cost and fee allocation. 252 She stated:
"It may be that in this case, as in Gilmer, there is a standard practice on
arbitrators' fees and expenses, one that fills the blank space in the arbitration
agreement." 253
That standard practice arguably does exist and can be traced to the
Consumer Protocol, which first articulated the need for "reasonable cost" in
arbitrations involving consumers,254 and which influenced the development
of rules by providers that were consistent with this principle. 255
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the protocols have thus far served
two functions for the courts. They inform the courts when articulating their
own standards of due process necessary for an arbitration process to
effectively vindicate a party's statutory rights and they provide a model or
standard from which to judge certain arbitration practices and procedures.
This last function is precisely why some industries choose self-regulation. 256
251 Id. at 95.
252 Id.
253 Id.; cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Wampler, 749 So.2d 409, 417 (Ala. 1999)
(concluding that because arbitration agreement did not incorporate Consumer Protocol or
rules of AAA with respect to arbitration of consumer claims, "the AAA rules and
protocol could serve only as a standard against which to test evidence of custom and
usage under the arbitration clause in the Wampler's Security Agreement").
254 Consumer Protocol, supra note 2, at Principle 6: Reasonable Cost. Principle 6
provides:
1. Reasonable Cost. Providers of goods and services should develop ADR
programs which entail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of
the dispute, including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the
nature of goods or services provided, and the ability of the Consumer to pay. In
some cases, this may require the Provider to subsidize the process.
2. Handling of Payment. In the interest of ensuring fair and independent
Neutrals, the making of fee arrangements and the payment of fees should be
administered on a rational, equitable and consistent basis by the Independent ADR
Institution.
Id.
255 See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text. Indeed, some providers have
gone beyond the Consumer Protocol and have put a cap on the costs to the consumer for
certain disputes. See infra note 460 and accompanying text.




4. Guidance to Legislatures
On the federal level, numerous bills have been introduced during the last
decade to combat many of the concerns that arise when arbitration in the
consumer or employment context is imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 257
The protocols played a significant role in the formation of one bill in
particular. In October 2000, Senator Sessions introduced the Consumer and
Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights. 258 That bill sought to amend the FAA to
provide certain rights to consumers and employees when required to arbitrate
a dispute.259 The bill was "based on the consumer and employee due process
protocols of the American Arbitration Association." 260 Although the bill did
not make it out of committee, it demonstrates the impact the protocols can
have on the development of the formal law. Indeed, an industry may develop
standards or "best practices" in order to influence subsequent legislation. 261
The protocols also appear to have played a role, albeit a limited one, in
the RUAA.262 In 1995, the National Conference of Commissioners on
257 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 964 n.69.
258 S. Res. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000).
259 n addition to requiring that the arbitration clause in the consumer or
employment contract be printed in bold, capital letters, state whether participation is
mandatory, identify a source that can be contacted to learn more information about the
arbitration process, particularly the costs and fees associated with it, and expressly give
the consumer notice that he or she may instead go to small claims court if the claim is
within the jurisdiction of the court and is less than $50,000, the bill also provided
procedural safeguards to those required to arbitrate. Id.
The procedural rights the bill sets forth included: the right to a competent and neutral
arbitrator, administration by an independent provider, application of the law that would
govern the dispute if the dispute had been brought in court, as well as the right to receive
the same relief that would be available in court, the right to be represented by an attorney,
access to information relevant to the dispute, a fair hearing at a convenient location
(unless the consumer or employee agrees to an electronic or telephonic hearing) at which
the parties can present evidence, cross examine witnesses, and request a record and a
timely written decision explaining the factual and legal basis for the decision. The
arbitrator was also given the authority to provide for reimbursement of the arbitration
fees to the claimant as part of the remedy and to waive, defer, or reduce the fee in cases
of extreme hardship. Id. In addition to providing such rights, the bill also provided the
parties with a means to enforce those rights. Id.
260 146 CONG. REc. S10619, 10625 (2000) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
261 See, e.g., Ian Maitland, The Limits of Business Self-Regulation, 27 CAL.
MANAGEMENT REv. 132, 138 (1985) (noting that standards of organizations may become
basis for subsequent legislation).
262 Revised Uniform Arbitration Act §§ 1-33, 7 U.L.A. 1-33 (Supp. 2002). The
original Uniform Arbitration Act, promulgated in 1955, is deemed one of the more
successful of the uniform laws. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have fully
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Uniform Laws (NCCUSL) began discussing the "feasibility of revising the
UAA ' ' 263 to modernize it, clarify certain ambiguous provisions, and to codify
existing case law. 264 After significant work by numerous persons and
organizations, 265 the NCCUSL officially approved the RUAA in August
2000.266 Since such approval, the RUAA has been endorsed by, among
others, various sections of the ABA, and by numerous arbitration service
providers, including the AAA, JAMS, and NAF.267 By the end of 2002, six
states had adopted the RUAA, 268 and an additional thirteen states were
considering the statute. 269
While the drafters were concerned about the fairness of the forum for all
participants in the arbitration process, 270 it recognized that that issue was
more acute for those who were required to arbitrate because the clause was
contained in a contract of adhesion. However, because of the concern about
preemption, 27 1 the drafters believed that, with the exception of certain
passed it and an additional 14 states passed laws that were similar to it. Id. at Prefatory
Note.
263 Matthew E. Braun, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 237, 237 (2002).
264 See Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: An Overview,
DisP. RESOL. J., May-July 2001 at 25, 28.
265 Participants in the process of revising the UAA included "liaisons from several
ABA committees .... a variety of arbitral organizations such as AAA, JAMS, CPR and
NAF, and observers from a number of groups interested in the continued use of
arbitration-representatives from the securities, construction and insurance industries."
Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, Is it the Wrong Cure? DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Summer 2002, at 10, 10-11.
266 Id. at 10.
267 Id. at 13 n.6.
268 Some of those states adopted the RUAA with revisions. See The RUAA Moves
Toward National Passage, DisP. REsOL. J., MAY-July 2002, at 5, 5.
269 Id.
270 See Stephen L. Hayford & Carroll E. Neesemann, A Response to RUAA Critics:
Codifying Modern Arbitration Law, Without Preemption, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2002, at 15, 15. The authors, an academic advisor to the NCCUSL drafting committee
and an official Observer at all meetings of the NCCUSL drafting committee, state:
From day one, the RUAA Drafting Committee of the... NCCUSL took as its
charge the creation of a model for modem state arbitration statutes that would
advance the state of the practice of arbitration and help make arbitration a truly fair
and viable substitute for traditional litigation in a court of law for anyone involved in
the process.
Id.





procedures that could not be waived by the parties, they were not able to
make any more specific rules for or limitations on arbitration when it is the
result of a contract of adhesion. 272 Instead, the drafters in the comment
section looked to state contract law for the determination of whether the
mandatory arbitration agreement should be enforced because it was
unconscionable. 273 In that connection, the drafters suggested that the
protocols be used by the courts as their "guideposts" in such determinations:
[the drafters of the RUAA] settled on a commentary on enforcement of
arbitration agreements identifying the special problems associated with
standardized adhesion contracts and citing various due process protocols
negotiated by affected public and private industry groups as guideposts for
courts in considering questions of unconscionability in contracts of
adhesion. 274
Accordingly, the content of those protocols will presumably influence state
legislatures who are reviewing and debating revisions to their state
arbitration laws.
5. Protocol's Affect on Outcomes
Some preliminary evidence exists that suggests that the outcomes for
claimants in employment arbitration have improved since adoption of the
Employment Protocol. Professor Lisa Bingham and Shimon Sarraf studied
and compared certain employment arbitration results at the AAA before and
after the AAA's incorporation of the principles of the Employment Protocol
in its rules governing employment arbitration. 275 The authors found that
"employers arbitrating pursuant to an adhesive arbitration clause in a
personnel manual after the Due Process Protocol have less success than
before the Due Process Protocol. 276 That finding led them to conclude that
272 Hayford & Neesemann, supra note 270, at 16.
273 "[T]he law of unconscionability can do, on a case-by-case basis, what the RUAA
could not as a uniform act." Id. One scholar has asserted that the RUAA does not do
enough to protect those required to arbitrate pursuant to a mandatory arbitration
agreement. See Cole, supra note 265, at 12; see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform
Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 759
(2001).
274 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 894.
275 Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 135, at 1 (abstract).
276 Id.
415
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self-regulation of arbitration through the adoption of the Employment
Protocol "is making a difference in employment arbitration." 277
This study looked at the overall pattern of outcomes produced by the
arbitration process in a sample of cases that were decided under the rules
used by the AAA from January 1, 1993 to June 1, 1996, a total of 265
cases.278 Of those cases, fifty-nine were decided pursuant to AAA rules that
were subject to the Employment Protocol. Although employer success
overall improved after incorporation of the Employment Protocol, the
evidence showed that "the likelihood of employer success decreased .206
times with the presence of the protocol and a personnel handbook, holding all
other independent variables constant. '279 The authors opined that the reason
for that result is that the AAA successfully screened handbook plans that
denied employees the basic due process protections contained in the
Employment Protocol.280
The preliminary results are favorable regarding the impact on outcomes
from adoption of the Employment Protocol. However, additional research is
needed in order to conclusively state that the protocols have removed the
procedural disadvantages that may have impacted on an employee's chance
of success in arbitration.
III. THE PROTOCOLS AS SELF-REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS
As Part II demonstrates, many good reasons led to the creation of the
protocols. The standards set forth in them sought to fill the gap left open by
the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer. The standards also sought to
preserve and maintain arbitration's image and reputation as a useful,
effective alternative dispute resolution process, one that could provide those
persons who are priced out of the current judicial system a viable alternative
forum. The protocols also sought to level the playing field for those who are
required to go to arbitration as a result of the unilateral imposition of
arbitration in a contract of adhesion.
The protocols are clearly an attempt to regulate the arbitration process.
Their role as a self-regulatory instrument or as a self-policing tool is apparent
277 Id.
278 The authors did not control for the merits of the actual case. They merely
identified the source of the agreement to arbitrate and the nature of the dispute as an





and has been noted by many commentators. 281 Lacking the force of law, their
effectiveness in accomplishing the goals set forth above is dependent upon a
number of related factors: (i) voluntary commitment to the standards by
arbitrators and arbitration service providers; (ii) the quality of the standards
set forth in the protocol; (iii) the ability to monitor adherence to the
protocols; and (iv) mechanisms to enforce such adherence by those who have
agreed to be bound by the protocols. 282 As we shall see, issues exist with
respect to each of these four factors that weaken the protocols' effectiveness.
Indeed, the effectiveness of the protocols is fundamentally undermined by
the lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
While it is undeniable that the protocols remain useful tools that have
already gone a long way to imposing certain fairness standards in a multitude
of arbitrations, their efficacy can be greatly improved and their standards
strengthened if monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are made part of the
protocols. The impact such mechanisms could have on the usefulness of the
protocols as well as on the manner in which such mechanisms could be
developed is discussed below. Also discussed below are issues concerning
the standards themselves, which, too, impacts on the effectiveness of the
protocols.
A. Self-Regulation as a Means to Preserve and Protect Arbitration as
a Dispute Resolution Process
Self-regulation through the adoption of standards of conduct is a means
to achieve collective action. "Self-regulation, self-enforcing institutions, self-
governance and communitarian regulation are all terms adopted to describe
self-organized attempts at collective action without direct intervention by the
281 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 83, at 69 n. 142 (citing to Consumer Protocol
and JAMS's Policy on Employment Arbitration, Minimum Standards of Procedural
Fairness, author concludes: "[it appears that the arbitration community has engaged in
some self-policing"); Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 135, at 2 ("Due Process Protocol
represents an effort to level the playing field [between repeat player and employee] by
introducing self-regulation and procedural safeguards into employment arbitration.");
Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: Last
Year's Trend Has Become This Year's Mainstay, 54 Bus. LAW. 1405, 1408 (1999) ("The
protocols and standards adopted by the AAA, JAMS, and the NAF exemplify the adage
that it is better to regulate oneself than to be regulated by others"); Jean R. Sternlight, Is
the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and
Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 842
(2002) (citing protocols as an example of how arbitration organizations have "engaged in
some self-regulation").
2 8 2 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 27 (1990).
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state." 283 Regulation of conduct can be done to "avoid a common threat or to
provide a common good. ' 284 In the case of the protocols, standards were
developed to achieve both goals; the drafters wanted to avoid the threat to
arbitration's image 285 and they wanted to be instrumental in providing a
process that they believed would provide a quicker, more cost-effective
means of dispute resolution. 286
The promulgation of the protocols to regulate the collective action of the
arbitration industry, including both individual arbitrators and arbitration
service providers, is not unlike the initiatives in collective action that have
been described by Professor Ostrom in her book, Governing the
Commons.287 There, the author suggests the use of cooperative action to
avoid the inevitable tragedy of the commons, which occurs when numerous
persons use a common resource to the point of causing the degradation of the
resource. 288 Such degradation occurs because rational users of the resource
283 Andrew King & Michael J. Lennox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions,
43 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 698, 698 (2000) (citations omitted).
284 Id.; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Industry Self-Regulation-Tested By
The Crash, 45 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1300 (1988) ("Self-regulation, like
government regulation, generally falls into three categories: promotional, standard-
setting, and disciplinary.").
285 Organizations involved in the business of providing arbitration services would
clearly benefit if courts and others continued to favor arbitration as a dispute resolution
process.
286 "Regardless of their individual performance, members of an industry are often
tarred by the same brush." King & Lennox, supra note 283, at 699; see also Arbitration:
Academy Board Endorses ADR Task Force Prototype, 104 DAILY LAB. REP (BNA) D 1I
(May 31 1995):
The fourth pressure to which Zack pointed "is the increasing risk that ... labor-
management arbitration will lose its credibility in the fact of unilaterally imposed
arbitration." *** "We must undertake to counter the perception that arbitration is
'rigged,' and to assure that claimants under such employer promulgated schemes be
accorded due process protections, to provide fair treatment, as well as to strive for
the goal that the process of arbitration, theirs as well as ours, be regarded as
equitable with adequate due process protections.
287 OSTROM, supra note 282, at 25.
288 " []he tragedy of the commons' has come to symbolize the degradation of the
environment to be expected whenever many individuals use a scarce resource in
common." Id. at 2. Although noting that the tragedy of the commons had been noted by
Aristotle, the author cites to the famous article by Garret Hardin, which appeared in
Science in 1968. In that article, Hardin describes the tragedy of the commons by
reference to herders who use a common pasture to graze their animals. Ostrom explains
that under Hardin's analogy, "[e]ach herder is motivated to add more and more animals
because he receives the direct benefit of his own animals and bears only a share of the
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use it in such a manner as to maximize the benefits they derive from it. They
will be motivated to use the resource as much as possible because they will
individually benefit from such overuse and the cost to the resource from
overuse by all users will not be born fully by each user but will be shared by
all users, at a later date. The answer to this paradox, "where individually
rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes," 289 Ostrom notes,
is typically one of two conflicting solutions: government regulation or
private ownership of the common resource. 290 Ostrom challenges those two
solutions and suggests a third: cooperative action by the users of the
common-pool resource, which may or may not use external institutions. 291
In many respects, the groups responsible for the protocols have sought to
use them to protect a common-pool resource, arbitration, or, more accurately,
the favored treatment the Supreme Court has bestowed upon arbitration since
at least 1983,292 from the inevitable degradation of it by abusive arbitration
provisions and practices. As was clear to the drafters of the protocol, there
were very few legal restrictions on the use of arbitration clauses and little
regulation of arbitration practice. The Supreme Court had endorsed
arbitration for statutory disputes and had not found any statutory claim
inarbitrable. Nor had the Court provided any specific rules regarding the
procedures that must be present in order for the arbitral process to adequately
vindicate a claimant's statutory rights. Thus, even today, anyone can use the
common resource and take advantage of it by requiring arbitration whenever
a contractual relationship exists, whether it be done directly, by specific
inclusion of the clause in a written contract between two or more parties, or
costs resulting from overgrazing." Id. at 2. In describing the destruction that takes place
from such overgrazing, Ostrom cites Hardin:
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that
believes in the freedom on the commons.
Id. (citing G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE 162: 1243-48).
289 Id. at 6. The notion that rational self-interested individuals will be unable to
achieve collective benefits has been detailed by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective
Action. There, Olson concludes that contrary to popular thought, "unless the number of
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or groups interests." MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965).
290 OSTROM, supra note 282, at 9, 12.
291 Id. at 15.
292 The Supreme Court first interpreted the FAA as evidencing a federal policy
favoring arbitration in Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983).
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indirectly, by inclusion of the clause in, for example, an employee's
handbook, or the material accompanying delivery of a product or a bill for
services. 293 As rational users, some imposing arbitration used it to extract as
many benefits as possible for themselves. Accordingly, they attempted to use
the process to obtain advantages which they could not have achieved in a
judicial forum. Such advantages ranged from limiting the remedies available
to claimants, to shortening the statute of limitations, to unilateral selection of
"neutrals." 294 Such use of the resource, the drafters of the protocols realized,
would lead to its destruction.
The destruction of arbitration could occur in a number of ways. For
example, in response to abusive arbitration provisions, Congress could
strictly regulate its use by, among other things, prohibiting pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. Arbitration could lose its favored status in the Supreme
Court. The Court could find the process as currently practiced incapable of
adequately vindicating statutory rights. It could reverse its decision in
Southland Corp. v. Keating,295 regarding the FAA's preemption of state laws
that prohibit certain arbitration agreements, as it has been repeatedly urged to
do so, 2 9 6 which would give states the power to regulate arbitration and the
use of the arbitral process. Before these events occurred, the creators of the
protocols sought to prevent arbitration's demise by calling for collective
action from those responsible for providing arbitration services and by
regulating the use of the resource by setting forth specific rules to govern the
procedures of arbitration. Ostrom believes that, under certain circumstances,
such cooperative action can be an effective means in which to govern the use
of a common pool resource so that the users of the resource can obtain long-
term collective benefits. 297
293 See infra note 365 and accompanying text (discussing such practices).
294 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F.Supp.2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998), aff'd,
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
295 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984).
296 One of the more recent attempts to persuade the Court to reverse the Southland
decision came in connection with the Court's decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003), a case concerning the appropriateness of class arbitration.
See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003) (No. 02-634).
297 OSTROM, supra note 282, at 29.
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B. Adequacy of the Standards to Produce Credible Commitments
1. Commitments Generally
It is obvious that the success of the protocols in regulating arbitration and
bringing about collective action so to preserve arbitration is primarily
dependent upon arbitrators' commitment to follow the protocols and to
decline to arbitrate a claim when the arbitration provided for in the
agreement does not adhere to the standards contained in the protocols. In
order for any self-regulatory scheme to work, commitments to follow the
rules have to be obtained by those directly involved in the industry or
business or those who appropriate the common pool resource.298 Two issues
arise in this connection: obtaining commitments from enough of the firms
involved to make the self-regulatory scheme work and making sure the
commitments obtained are credible.
Joint collective benefits cannot be achieved and self-regulation cannot
succeed unless most firms or players in the industry agree to participate. 299
Failure of a part of the industry to sign onto the regulatory scheme will put
those who are willing to agree to sign on to it at a competitive
disadvantage. 3°° Unless the "government intervenes directly to curb the
activities of non-participants," the self-regulatory scheme cannot work.30 1
Commitments by individuals or firms in the arbitration industry is not as
straight forward as it may be in other industries. There are numerous ways a
person or persons can be retained as an arbitrator. In an agreement to
arbitrate, the parties can mutually agree and identify the person or persons
whom they want to resolve their dispute. Each party can also select an
arbitrator of their choosing and those arbitrators may select the third
arbitrator. Persons selected can be experienced arbitrators and members of a
professional alternative dispute resolution organization, or they can be
anyone the parties feel comfortable with in resolving the dispute.30 2 There is
no requirement that the selected person be familiar with the law of
arbitration, or be associated with any of the major providers of arbitration
services. There is also no requirement that the parties select persons who are
familiar with, or who have agreed to abide by, the protocols or any other
298 Id. at 43-44.
299 Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 LAW & POL'Y 363, 394 (1997).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Of course, the arbitrator cannot be biased; if that is the case, the award can be
vacated under the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
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codes applicable to arbitrators, such as the Code of Ethics promulgated by
the AAA and SPIDR. Indeed, the ability to select the decisionmaker is a
hallmark of arbitration and that freedom has not been constrained by law.
Entire organizations 30 3 or industries can also develop their own arbitration
programs and have, in fact, done so.304 There is no requirement that such
programs be "independent" of the parties' industry or business.
Another way an arbitrator can be retained is when the parties agree that
the arbitration will proceed in accordance with the rules of a particular
arbitration service provider.30 5 n that connection, the provider will
administer the arbitration and the arbitrator(s) may be selected from the
303 For example, Kaiser Permanente administered its own arbitration system until a
blue ribbon task force, created in the wake of criticism of the program, recommended the
creation of an independent administer to supervise the program. See Engalla v.
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 922 (Cal. 1997); The Kaiser Permanente
Arbitration System: A Review and Recommendations for Improvement, submitted by
The Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel on Kaiser Permanente Arbitration (January 1998) (on
file with author).
304 For example, the securities industry has administered its own arbitration system
since at least 1872, when the NYSE began offering arbitration for the resolution of
disputes between its members and their customers. The American Stock Exchange
commenced its program in 1964, and the NASD began in 1968. See PHILIP J. HOBLIN,
JR., SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 1-2 (2d ed. 1992).
305 Arbitration service providers have undergone a significant change "since the
days when the AAA was virtually unique as an institutional provider of conflict
resolution services." Thomas J. Stipanowich, Behind the Neutral-A Look at Provider
Issues, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES 813, 816 (1999).
According to Professor Stipanowich, today's landscape of providers of ADR services
includes:
complex, multifaceted organizations of national and international scope to ad-hoc
arrangements among individuals. Somewhere in between are more specialized
services marketing particular procedures (such as adherence to rules of law and
evidence and written arbitration awards) or "celebrity" panelists (e.g. emeritus
judges); groups that have evolved to serve the special needs of a community,
industry or business sector; and mom-and-pop mediation services.
Id.
The critical role arbitration service providers play in the administration of private
justice has led to the promulgation of "the first-ever set of guidelines for ADR Provider
organizations, designed to suggest "best practices" and "baseline" measures for provider
organizations in the provision of arbitration and other ADR services." Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 185, at 965; see Stipanowich, supra note 130, at 13. In those guidelines, an
"ADR Provider Organization" is defined to include "any entity or individual which holds
itself out as managing or administering dispute resolution or conflict management
services." Symposium, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR,
Principles for ADR Provider Organizations, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 983, app. A at 987
(2002) [hereinafter Principles for ADR Provider Organizations].
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roster of arbitrators maintained by the provider. Those on the roster will
typically be persons who have been trained as arbitrators and who have
agreed to abide by the provider's rules, including those rules that reflect the
protocols and the ethical principles the arbitrator should follow in connection
with the provision of arbitration services. The identification and selection of
neutrals is one of the most important functions engaged in by providers. 30 6
While the major arbitration service providers have formally or informally
endorsed the protocols, crafted rules to reflect the due process principles set
forth in the protocols, and agreed to decline to provide arbitration services if
the agreement does not comport with the protocols, 307 there is no way to
ascertain the voluntary commitment to the protocols by individual arbitrators
who are not selected through a major service provider. This is a troubling
notion considering that the vice-president of a major arbitration service
provider in an interview concerning proposed legislation in California
seeking to regulate the alternative dispute resolution industry, indicated that
most of the consumer arbitrations were being conducted by individual
neutrals and not by the major providers.30 8 If it is true that most arbitrators
are not bound to follow the principles of the protocols, 30 9 and arbitrations are
occurring where due process protections may be absent or subject to the
whim of the arbitrator or one of the parties, it is clear that the protocols have
failed as a self-regulatory instrument and government intervention is needed
to regulate the industry.
The failure of individual neutrals to commit to the protocols may be due
to what has been termed the "assurance problem." 310 This theory posits that
individual firms refuse to commit to a set of standards not because they have
calculated that the benefits they will receive from not following the standards
will be greater than the benefits from following the standards, but "because
[they are] unable to obtain the necessary assurance that other firms will
306 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 875.
307 See supra notes 183-196 and accompanying text.
308 Kevin Livingston, Taking on Arbitration, THE RECORDER, March 12, 2002, at 1.
It is difficult to ascertain whether the major arbitration service providers are handling
most of the arbitrations that are occurring in the employment and consumer contexts. As
mentioned previously, Professor Menkel-Meadow has stated that the "vast majority" of
arbitrations occurring in the United States are sponsored in some manner by provider
organizations. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 965.
309 It is of course possible that a neutral, unaffiliated with a major arbitration service
provider, is nevertheless committed to the protocols because he or she is a member of an
ADR professional organization.
3 10 See, e.g., Ian Maitland, supra note 261 at 134 (citing C. Ford Runge, Institutions
and the Free-Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 54 J. POL., 154-81
(1984)).
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contribute their fair share. '311 With respect to the protocols, even if all
working arbitrators agreed to follow the protocols, there is nothing in the
protocols to provide assurance that those individuals and firms do, in fact,
what they promise. There are no monitoring devices and no devices to
compel compliance by those who have previously agreed to be bound by the
protocols. The lack of those mechanisms may make a firm reluctant to
comply and be put at a disadvantage when others in the industry are not
being held to their promises. "Individuals frequently are willing to forgo
immediate returns in order to gain larger joint benefits when they observe
many others following the same strategy." 312 Without monitoring, it is
impossible to "observe" other individual neutrals following the protocols.
The assurance problem is much more acute for individual neutrals than it
is for large providers. Indeed, the major providers have been very public
concerning their commitment to follow the protocols and their willingness to
decline to arbitrate a claim if the process does not comply with the protocols.
An individual neutral may have to turn away significant business in order to
comply with the protocols. It is likely that those insisting on an arbitration
that does not comply with the protocols will be able to find a neutral who
will nonetheless hear and administer the case. Accordingly, individual
neutrals may be unwilling to forego that short term financial benefit until
they are assured that others in the industry will do the same, regardless of the
fact that collective action may ultimately provide them with benefits (such as
enhancement of arbitration's image, which could lead to additional business,
or no government regulation) greater than they could receive when acting
independently (and contrary to the protocols).3 13 Without that assurance,
commitment to the protocols is hard to obtain from individual neutrals and
that failure may even impact on the commitment of large providers.
It is not surprising that the large arbitration service providers readily
agreed to be bound by the protocols, and in some respects, were the driving
force behind their creation. These firms have a "high public profile"; the
consequence to them of a poor record of implementing fair arbitration
programs is both "substantial and visible. '314 In addition, these firms, unlike
individual neutrals, "can usually afford to consider a range of goals in
addition to short-term profits. ' 315 However, the commitment of a large firm
311 Id.
312 OSTROM, supra note 282, at 39.
313 "[T]hose firms that are economically marginal (generally small-to medium-
sized enterprises) cannot afford the luxury of a longer-term view." Gunningham, supra
note 9, at 65.




can be challenged when others refuse to commit or refuse to abide by their
commitments because they may no longer receive the benefits anticipated by
self-regulation:
If a significant number of smaller companies do not comply, then large
companies lose much of the incentive to continue their own voluntary
action. If the public fails to distinguish "good" and "bad" companies, but
rather blames the industry as a whole.. . then good companies will suffer
the stigma, lack of credibility, and public backlash caused by the misdeeds
of noncomplying companies.316
Accordingly, if voluntary compliance with the protocols by the large
providers is incapable of preserving arbitration's image because of the
conduct of individual providers, or of making arbitration an attractive
alternative to the judicial system for the resolution of disputes, the large
providers will lose their incentive to comply with the protocols. At that point,
unless Congress takes action, regulation of arbitration will occur only on an
ad hoc basis by the judicial system when it is called upon to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate or to determine the legality of an arbitrator's award
challenged pursuant to the FAA.
2. Obtaining Credible Commitments
A related aspect of the commitment issue is ensuring that the
commitments received are "credible." A credible commitment is found when
a firm foregoes opportunistic behavior and follows the self-regulatory
scheme. "In every group there will be individuals who will ignore norms and
act opportunistically when given a chance. There are also situations in which
the potential benefits will be so high that even strongly committed
individuals will break norms." 317
Those who act opportunistically are sometimes referred to as "free-
riders." These are firms that "take advantage of the willingness of other
firms" to follow the scheme and expend the necessary resources to do so.318
Because they "cannot be excluded from the benefits that the others
provide," 319 their decision to refrain from complying is thus considered a
"matter of rational, economic self-interest;" 320 they reap the benefits of self-
regulation without paying the cost. Unless a self-regulatory scheme has
316 Id. at 67.
317 OsTROM, supra note 282, at 36.
318 Gunningham, supra note 9, at 67.
319 OSTRoM, supra note 282, at 6.
320 Gunningham, supra note 9, at 67.
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within it mechanisms to deter firms or individuals from succumbing to this
temptation, each firm will be "motivated not to contribute to the joint effort,
but to free-ride on the efforts of others. If all participants choose to free-ride,
the collective benefit will not be produced. '321
Unless there is a way to identify those arbitrators or providers who fail to
follow the due process standards embodied in the protocols, they will
continue to enjoy the benefits that the protocols have produced. That
behavior will continue until the point is reached when such free-riding
eliminates the benefits altogether. Although such benefits are somewhat
speculative and difficult to quantify, the protocols have nonetheless produced
some benefits that have been enjoyed by arbitrators who shirk the due
process standards of the protocols.
The most obvious benefit may be that the protocols have helped to clothe
the practice of mandatory arbitration for statutory disputes in legitimacy. It is
difficult to object to or criticize the use of arbitration in this instance when
the Employment Protocol, for instance, states that it embodies "standards of
exemplary due process" in. the conduct of such arbitration. 322 In addition, the
existence of the protocols may have diminished. the urgency for
congressional intervention. Knowing that persons subject to arbitration are
getting a "fundamentally fair hearing" 323 pursuant to the protocols may be
the reason that, for the last decade, Congress has been unable to pass any
legislation relating to the use of.arbitration for statutory disputes and the
processes that should be followed once that arbitration occurs.
Scholars of. self-regulation agree that in order to prevent such
opportunistic behavior, the self-regulatory scheme must contain mechanisms
for monitoring a firm's compliance with the scheme and some kind of
sanctioning device to punish firms when they act opportunistically. 324 The
protocols are absolutely deficient in this connection. None of the protocols
contain any mechanisms for identifying persons who fail to follow the
protocol, for monitoring compliance by those who have agreed to follow the
protocol, and for sanctioning them when they have failed to fulfill their
321 OSTROM, supra note 282, at 6.
322 See Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 173.
323 See e.g., Consumer Protocol, supra note 2, at Principle 1; Health Care Protocol,
supra note 2, at Principle 1.
3 2 4 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 103
(1992) ("[W]e argue that- retaining public enforcement (detection and punishment) of
privately promulgated standards is likely to be an important component in constituting
genuine private self-enforcement"); Maitland, supra note 261, at 139 (need to give peak
organization power of compulsion "to reflect the real world probability that some number
of opportunistic firms will disregard code .... Some form of sovereign to enforce terms
of the social contract then becomes indispensable").
[Vol. 19:2 2004]
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS
obligations under the protocol. For these reasons, the protocols are not as
effective as they could be and can be seriously undermined by the "free-
riding" of non-compliant arbitrators.
3. Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement of the Protocols
The protocols do not contain any mechanisms designed to monitor a
firm's compliance with their requirements. Neither arbitrators nor providers
are required to self-monitor and report about their compliance, nor are they
subjected to monitoring by a third-party or entity. Significantly, the protocols
do not contain any mechanisms for the parties most impacted by a firm's
failure to follow the protocol to complain that the protocol was not adhered
to in a particular arbitration. 325 Although a firm may have agreed to follow
the protocol, 326 it is impossible to ascertain whether the firm has in fact done
so in individual cases. There is clearly a lack of transparency with respect to
compliance with the protocols.
In the context of self-regulation, transparency can be divided into three
broad categories: (i) "public announcement of the principles and practices
that the industry presumptively accepts as a guide to appropriate conduct and
also as a basis for evaluating and criticizing performance"; (ii) "development
of an information system for collecting data on the progress of member
companies in implementing the industry codes"; and (iii) "monitoring
325 Stemlight, supra note 281, at 842 n.81 ("Even when the organization's rules
require compliance with a particular Due Process Protocol, a complainant has no clear
remedy if the organization nonetheless agrees to administer a clause that fails to comply
with a Protocol.").
Although "[m]ost of the more formal ADR provider organizations do provide for
grievance committees or ethics committees... [t]here are as yet, however, no formal
requirements that such organizations proyide such procedures for enforcing even their
own rules." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 970. For that reason, the drafters of the
Provider Principles included such a provision. Principle VI Complaint and Grievance
Mechanisms states:
ADR Provider Organizations should provide mechanisms for addressing grievances
about the Organization, and its administration or the neutral services offered, and
should disclose the nature and availability of the mechanisms to the parties in a
clear, accurate and understandable manner. Complaint and grievance mechanisms
should also provide a fair and impartial process for the affected neutral or other
individual against whom a grievance has been made.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 996.
326 Steps have been taken by firms to comply with the Protocols. For example, the
AAA has assigned one person to review all agreements that name the AAA as the
provider organization to ensure that the agreement is in compliance. Bingham & Sarraf,
supra note 135, at 13.
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performance. '327 Self-regulation through the creation and adoption of the
protocols by the major providers has achieved transparency with respect to
only the first category. Transparency must be achieved across all three
categories in order for the protocols to be effective self-regulatory
instruments. 328
This lack of transparency is probably the most troubling aspect of the
protocols and is a serious weakness, which is compounded by the fact that
arbitration is a confidential process-making transparency even harder to
achieve. Providers of arbitration services encourage the use of arbitration
with the promise that due process protections will be followed. They have,
either intentionally or not, been able to fend off more intrusive government
regulation at the federal level. 329 Their adoption of the protocols has also
helped preserve arbitration's golden image, at least in the judiciary's mind,
where arbitration is still granted favored status. It is therefore imperative that
their conformance to the protocols is monitored and made public.
The damaging effect of the lack of monitoring and enforcement devices
to the efficacy of the protocols cannot be fully appreciated until arbitration's
unique role in dispensing private justice is broadly examined and viewed in
the context of the present regulatory environment in which arbitration exists.
As will be shown below, the lack of accountability in the protocols is even
more problematic because of the lack of other mechanisms that could hold
arbitrators and providers accountable for their conduct.
a. The Regulatory Environment
The arbitration industry, including both the arbitrators and the entities
that provide administrative services in connection with an arbitration, is
virtually unregulated. 330 Unless arbitration occurs in connection with a court
327 Gunningham & Rees, supra note 299, at 383-84.
328 Concern about transparency in the arbitration industry appears to be one of the
factors that led to the enactment of legislation regulating certain aspects of the industry
by the California state legislature. One supporter of the legislation indicated to a reporter
that "part of the problem stems from the secrecy in which the industry operates."
Livingston, supra note 308, at 1.
329 The AAA very publicly denounced the efforts by the California legislature to
regulate the industry. See, e.g., William K. Slate II, The Justice-at-a-Price Guys Take
Aim at Arbitration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at B13. That denouncement led to a call
for a boycott of the AAA by the San Francisco Trial Lawyers Association. See Alexei
Oreskovic, S.F. Trial Lawyers Boycott Arbitration Association Over Statements, THE
RECORDER, Oct. 8, 2002, at 9.
330 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 964-65 ("[B]ut for the most part,
the practice of arbitration.., is unregulated and virtually anyone can 'hang out a
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or state-sponsored program that has formal standards for arbitrators, 331
anyone can be an arbitrator; there is no formal qualifying examination, no
licensing or educational requirements, and no requirement that the person
offering arbitration services be trained in any way. There is also no
requirement that an arbitrator follow any particular code of ethics. While the
lack of such standards and requirements may be beneficial in some respects,
particularly because it does not bar a person of the parties' choosing from
serving as an arbitrator, it nevertheless means that the profession, especially
in terms of competency and ethics, is largely unregulated.
Of course, those arbitrators serving through a provider organization may
have to possess certain qualifications in order to be eligible to be on the
provider's roster. They would also be obligated to follow the provider's rules
with respect to the arbitration process, including the standards set forth in the
protocols, and would have to comply with the provider's ethical code of
conduct. Training could also be required in order to be eligible to arbitrate
certain kinds of disputes, including employment disputes. 332 However,
concern has been voiced that such providers do not effectively enforce their
codes,333 and even when they do so, nothing is done to prevent the offending
arbitrator from practicing solo or with another provider organization. 334
shingle"'); Margaret L. Shaw & Elizabeth Plapinger, ADR Provider Organizations
Should Increase Transparency, Disclosure, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 14
(noting that ADR provider organizations are "largely unregulated entities").
331 See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 955 (discussing court
sponsored ADR).
332 See, e.g., Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 174-75.
333 See, e.g., Cameron L. Sabin, Note, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel:
Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV.
1337, 1354 (2002) ("The first and most fundamental reason that codes of ethics are
ineffective is that enforcement of ethics codes is discretionary and the arbitration industry
is reluctant to enforce its codes."). Cf. Cliff Palefsy, Only a Start: ADR Provider Ethics
Principles Don't Go Far Enough, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 18, 20 ("Self-
regulation of the arbitration industry has been a dismal failure.").
334 Even if a provider is willing to "delist" a member for failure to abide by its rules,
such "delisting" will not necessarily stop the person from arbitrating:
An association's enforcement powers extend only to its own members.
Consequently, even if arbitration associations strictly enforce their codes by
expelling arbitrators for misconduct, nothing prevents expelled arbitrators from
practicing for another association or on their own; and because arbitration
associations do not provide public listings of sanctioned or expelled arbitrators,
other associations and the public have no means to identify and avoid unethical
arbitrators. Because these associations are private, moreover, there is no way to
insure consistent enforcement.
Sabin, supra note 333, at 1355.
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i. The Regulatory Impact of Federal and State Law
The federal government has not completely abdicated its role in
regulating arbitration. For example, securities arbitration, which is handled
by the self-regulatory organizations formed pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, is subject to oversight by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 335 Dispute resolution mechanisms used in connection
with certain disputes regarding consumer products and warranties are also
regulated. 336
In addition, the FAA itself provides a mechanism for a party to challenge
an arbitration award if the party believes "there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators" or where the arbitrators engaged in misconduct
by "refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. '337
The FAA, however, is not deemed to be an effective tool for policing
arbitrator misconduct for several reasons. 338 Arbitrators do not usually
provide written opinions setting forth the reasons for their award, 339 and the
335 See, e.g., Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in
Securities Arbitration: The Further Aggravation of Unequal Bargaining Power, 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 109, 121 (1996) (discussing the role played by the SEC and the self-
regulatory organizations in connection with securities arbitration).
336 See generally Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 16 C.F.R. § 703 (2003).
137 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). The court may also vacate an award "where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10. A court also has
the power to modify or correct an arbitrator's award. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
338 See Sabin, supra note 333, at 1347-48.
339 Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking
the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 444-45 (1998) (noting that in the commercial arbitration field,
arbitrators "seldom articulate their reasons for decision in their written awards").
The protocols are unlikely to significantly change this practice. The Employment
Protocol merely requires the arbitrator to "issue an opinion and award setting forth a
summary of the issues, including the type(s) of dispute(s), the damages and/or other relief
requested and awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, and a statement
regarding the disposition of any statutory claim." Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at
176-77. The Consumer Protocol requires that the arbitrator "provide a brief written
explanation of the basis for the award," if a party timely requests it. Consumer Protocol,
supra note 2, at Principle 15. Similarly, the Health Care Protocol requires the arbitrator
to accompany an award by an opinion, if a party requests it. Health Care Protocol, supra
note 2, at Principle 9. No standards are provided concerning the scope of the opinion. 1f a
party is concerned about costs, it is unlikely that the party will undertake the additional
cost of requesting the opinion, even in its briefest form.
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lack of a reasoned opinion makes it extremely difficult to challenge the
award in court.340 The grounds listed in the FAA for vacatur are "interpreted
in an 'extraordinarily narrow' fashion," 34 1 precluding a court from reviewing
the merits of the controversy. 342 Moreover, the remedy available under the
FAA, vacatur, is "arguably an unsatisfactory remedy because the parties face
the costs of reengaging in a second round of arbitration." 34 3
Courts have attempted to alleviate the strictness of the FAA's grounds
for vacatur. A few non-statutory grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award
have been recognized by the courts. 34 4 The most commonly used ground,
"manifest disregard of the law," has been adopted by most courts. 34 5
However, although courts recognize a small handful of non-statutory grounds
for vacatur, it is nonetheless equally difficult to obtain vacatur on these
grounds, due, once again, to the lack of a reasoned opinion by the arbitrator:
"It is clear, that, to date, the absence of substantive reasoned awards
revealing the manner in which arbitrators have decided the cases before them
has been a major factor in effectively insulating challenged arbitration
awards from vacatur on the basis on non-statutory grounds." 34 6
While regulation of arbitration at the federal level is minimal at best,
states, on the other hand, have made various attempts to regulate arbitration.
State power to regulate arbitration, however, has been significantly limited
by a line of Supreme Court cases that have found certain state laws related to
arbitration preempted by the FAA. 347 States are powerless to prohibit the
340 Hayford, supra note 339, at 445 ("[W]hen arbitrators do not provide substantive
written awards revealing their mode of decision, judicial vacation of the award is
virtually precluded.").
341 Sabin, supra note 333, at 1349 (quoting Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc.,
899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990)).
342 Hayford, supra note 339, at 452.
343 Sabin, supra note 333, at 1349.
344 Hayford, supra note 339, at 461. Among the non-statutory grounds recognized
by courts for vacatur is when the award "(1) is in 'manifest disregard of the law'; (2) is in
direct conflict with 'public policy'; (3) is 'arbitrary and capricious'; (4) is 'completely
irrational'; or (5) 'fails to draw its essence' from the parties' underlying contract." Id.
(citations omitted).
345 Id. at 450-51. The manifest disregard of the law standard requires the party
challenging the award to show that "[t]he error must have been obvious and capable of
being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an
arbitrator" and "that the arbitrator appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1995).
346 Hayford, supra note 339, at 464-65.
347 Preemption occurs because the FAA represents substantive federal law and as
such displaces any state law or policy that conflicts with the FAA. See Southland Corp. v.
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enforceability of arbitration agreements and they cannot, consistent with the
FAA, condition the enforceability of an arbitration provision on the
satisfaction of terms that are not imposed upon contracts generally.348
However, general state contract law, including traditional defenses to the
enforceability of a contract, is not preempted by the FAA.349 Parties have
attempted to use these defenses, with mixed results, to invalidate, among
other things, unconscionable arbitration agreements. The assertion of such
defenses to the arbitration agreement may explain some of the increase in
judicial intervention that has been noted by commentators. 350
ii. The Effect of Civil Liability in Regulating Arbitrator
Conduct
Not only are arbitrators and arbitration service providers unregulated,
they are also immune from civil liability in connection with the services they
perform. Arbitrators are private judges, retained by the parties, to render a
decision concerning the conflict at issue. Arbitration service providers are
retained to perform a variety of essential services to facilitate the arbitration.
"They often play a critical part in designing the ADR process and fine-tuning
the procedural rules that will apply." 351 In addition to their role in
"[e]stablishing and maintaining a pool of neutrals who meet its requirements
for listing," 352 the provider may also make decisions regarding the
"scheduling of some procedures, such as the timing of preliminary
discussions among the parties or the scheduling and location of initial
hearings ... and assist in the neutral selection process by identifying
prospective neutrals based on the criteria provided by the parties, and, in
some cases, making the appointment. ' 353 Providers may also rule upon a
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (noting that the FAA preempted state law that prohibited
arbitration of claims brought pursuant to the Franchise Investment Law); see also Allied
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (FAA preempted state law
that prohibited pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer agreements); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (noting that the FAA preempted California law that prohibited
arbitration of wage claims).
348 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) (noting that the
FAA preempted state law that required that arbitration clause to be presented in
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract).
349 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987) (citation omitted).
350 See Gary Young, Courts Increase Intervention in Arbitrations, N.L.J., March 3,
2003, at A15.





challenge to an appointed arbitrator and may "'troubleshoot' problems which
the neutrals cannot or will not address, including payment issues. '354
Because arbitrators perform judicial functions, they are granted
immunity by the courts for "arbitral acts" that occur within their
jurisdiction. 355 Although such quasi-judicial immunity does not protect an
arbitrator from liability for criminal acts or nonfeasance, such immunity
makes it virtually impossible for an aggrieved party to hold an arbitrator
responsible for damages caused by his or her "misconduct or error."356
Arbitration service providers also enjoy immunity. "The principle of
arbitral immunity is well-established in the courts, along with a 'penumbra'
of immunity for providers." 357 Accordingly, these associations also cannot be
held accountable for their misconduct in connection with the provision of
arbitration services.358 Such immunity seems to extend to the provider's
failure to ensure not only that its arbitrators follow its ethical code, but that
the arbitrators and the providers adhere to the due process protocols.
Accordingly, unlike most industries and professions, the arbitration industry
cannot be held responsible for its acts of misfeasance. We currently have a
"present legal structure that gives arbitrators complete autonomy over the
dispute resolution process, yet requires virtually no accountability of
them." 359 While such immunity is not unprecedented, it is certainly
problematic, for a number of reasons, which are beyond the scope of this
Article but which are discussed by other commentators. 360 Because
differences exist between the role of the judiciary and the role of arbitrators
in the dispute resolution landscape, the adoption of such immunity has been
questioned, and has led to calls for reform. 361
354 Id.
355 See Mark A. Sponseller, Note, Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed
Qualified Immunity Statute for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 421, 428 (1993) (citing
Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUS. REL. L. J. 228, 242
(1989)); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 963 ("Because arbitrators often
enjoy a 'quasi-judicial immunity' for performing judicial-like services, their conduct is
virtually never reviewed in a legally filed malpractice action.").
356 Sabin, supra note 333, at 1350-53.
357 Stipanowich, supra note 305, at 817; see also Sponseller, supra note 355, at 428
("Arbitration associations, in turn, derive their immunity from the arbitrator.").
358 Presumably the exceptions to an arbitrator's immunity, based on criminal acts or
nonfeasance, would apply equally to the provider.
359 Sabin, supra note 333, at 1345.
360 See generally id.; Sponseller, supra note 355.
361 See, e.g., Sponseller, supra note 355, at 442-47 (suggesting that common law
immunity for arbitrators be statutorily amended to grant arbitrators only qualified
immunity); see also Stipanowich, supra note 305, at 817 (noting that arbitral immunity
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
iii. The Limits of the "Market" to Regulate Arbitration
As was detailed in Part II, arbitration, with due process protections, was
deemed a satisfactory alternative to court adjudication for employment
disputes not subject to a collective bargaining agreements partly because of
the positive impact arbitration had on labor disputes. However, labor
arbitration takes place in a significantly different environment than
employment, consumer, and health care arbitration. 362 Because of the
characteristics of labor arbitration, market forces can better regulate the
practice of arbitration by weeding out incompetent or unethical arbitrators
and providers. As will be shown below, the current environment in which
employment, consumer and health care arbitrations take place makes it
difficult for those same market forces to provide effective regulation of
arbitration. 36 3
At the outset, the agreement to arbitrate a dispute with an employer in the
union context is the result of arms-length bargaining by parties of relatively
equal bargaining power.364 Employment, consumer, and health care
arbitration, on the other hand, typically arises because of the existence of a
non-negotiable term that is imposed upon the employee, consumer, and
patient by the employer, merchant, and health care provider. Thus, arbitration
clauses are contained in contracts of adhesion where the less powerful party
cannot negotiate the existence or even the details of the clause. Such clauses,
was debated during the efforts to revise the UAA). Cf Sabin, supra note 333, at 1368-80
(proposed a licensing requirement for arbitrators to, in part, alleviate the impact on
arbitral accountability caused by arbitral immunity).
362 See Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to
the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 737-40 (2001)
(discussing the difference between labor and employment arbitration).
363 As one commentator has noted:
The practice of mandatory arbitration has changed everything. Now arbitration
providers need only one satisfied customer to get repeat business, and it is always
the same customer: the large corporation. Providers routinely refer to these
companies as their "clients" and direct most of their marketing activities toward
them because of the ability of these companies to deliver significant volumes of
cases through the imposition of adhesion contracts on consumers and employees.
The ability of the parties and free market to regulate the neutrality and ethics of the
providers has been eliminated.
Palefsky, supra note 333, at 19.
364 See, e.g., Getman, supra note 146, at 933 ("When labor arbitration has been
successful, it is because collective bargaining has established a rough equality and mutual
respect between the parties."); Gorman, supra note 14, at 649 ('The grievance and
arbitration procedure in a collective bargaining agreement is a product of conscious
choice, and often extensive and arms' length negotiation between both parties.").
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presented on a take-it-or leave it basis, may even be "accepted" by the
employer, consumer, or patient without his or her knowledge of its
existence. 365 Accordingly, whatever regulation of the arbitration process that
can occur during the negotiation of the arbitration clause itself is completely
absent in most arbitrations subject to the protocols.
Labor arbitration is characterized by "two institutional repeat players" 366
who are generally represented by counsel. 367 As institutional repeat players,
the parties are in a position to develop information about particular
arbitrators. 368 That information gives the parties the ability to control the
pool of acceptable arbitrators. If an arbitrator is found to be incompetent or
unethical or if he or she fails to provide the parties the due process
protections that labor arbitration promises, the parties, in future arbitrations,
will decline to find that arbitrator acceptable for service. This would,
presumably, drive the arbitrator out of the business of deciding labor disputes
subject to the grievance arbitration process.
This "self-regulation of the arbitration system"369 cannot take place when
one of the parties to the arbitration is not a repeat player, but an incidental
one, incapable of influencing the future employment of an acceptable
arbitrator. Such one-shot players are also unable to develop an institutional
memory about particular arbitrators, which greatly affects their ability to
select an acceptable arbitrator to hear a particular dispute.370
365 Arbitration clauses have been found in, for example, an employee handbook, the
"terms and conditions agreement" sent along with the delivery of a consumer product,
and the "stuffer" material accompanying a merchant's bill. See, e.g., Blair v. Scott
Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2002) (employee handbook); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (terms and conditions agreement);
Ting v. A.T&T., 182 F. Supp. 2d. 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), affid in part, rev'd in part, 319
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.), and petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3680 (U.S. April 16, 2003)
(No. 02-1521) (stuffer material).
366 Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 135, at 1.
367 Getman, supra note 146, at 920 n.15.
368 Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 135, at 1 ("Theory suggests repeat players will do
better than one-shot players because of factors including the ability to use experience from one
transaction to structure the next one, access to specialized legal counsel, bargaining reputation
and credibility, and familiarity with neutrals and administrators.").
369 Id. at 21.
370 Lisa Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A
Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108, 119 (1996); see also Maltby, supra note 14, at
19-22 (discussing the difficulty of duplicating for a one-shot employee the institutional
memory possessed by a repeat player so that the employee has information concerning a
proposed arbitrator's impartiality); Gorman, supra note 14, at 656 (noting that the
concern that an arbitrator will favor the repeat player in an arbitration is absent in
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The regulatory function the written opinion plays in grievance arbitration
is also absent in non-union arbitration. Labor arbitrators "normally write
opinions, albeit usually rather brief ones, that set forth findings about
important disputed facts and conclusions about the interpretation and
application of the labor agreement."' 371 Requiring an arbitrator to explain his
or her award clearly influences an arbitrator's decisionmaking process; it is
much more difficult to be blatantly biased, unfair, or arbitrary when called
upon to explain yourself. Moreover, those labor decisions can be published
and thereby subject to scrutiny by, among others, the institutional players and
their representatives.
As previously discussed, the protocols do not require an arbitrator to
provide an explanation of his or her award, unless specifically requested to
do so by one of the parties. Even if a reasoned opinion is obtained from the
arbitrator, it may remain private between the parties to the dispute. The
market cannot work to rid the arbitrator pool of unacceptable arbitrators
when the market lacks information as to the arbitrator's decisionmaking
processes.
Thus, the market, while possibly effective in regulating grievance
arbitration that takes place pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
cannot be counted on to be effective in regulating arbitration as it is
occurring today involving non-union employees, consumers, and patients. 372
Those players generally have no real and meaningful choice but to arbitrate
the dispute and no choice in the selection of the arbitration service provider,
which, as described earlier, plays a critical role in the dispute resolution
process. In addition, because those players are not repeat players, they lack
information that hinders both their selection of arbitrators and their role in
influencing the future employment of an arbitrator. Because the market
cannot play its usual role in regulating conduct, monitoring and sanctioning
mechanisms are particularly critical to the usefulness of the protocols in
regulating the arbitration process.
grievance arbitration where an institutional memory is developed because of the union's
participation on behalf of the employee).
371 Gorman, supra note 14, at 666.
372 Cf Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 950-51 ("While some claim that the
market will sufficiently discipline a process in which arbitrators must be agreed to by the
parties, I believe it essential that some forms of transparency, disclosure, rules, sanctions,
and consequences will be necessary for arbitration to maintain any semblance of legal
legitimacy and justice.") (citations omitted).
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iv. The Limits of Professional Associations to Regulate
Arbitration
Professional associations can serve a regulatory function. 373 By creating
"codes of conduct" and "best practices," members in the association will
know what is expected of them in order to be in good standing. In addition,
professional associations can limit membership in the association to those
who meet certain qualifications. The threat that the association will enforce
its rules against its members can greatly influence the conduct of the
members.
The arbitration industry has a number of professional associations
arbitrators can join, and those associations, although not required to do so,
have adopted ethical codes that members are expected to follow.374 However,
arbitrators are not required to join a professional association; membership is
not compulsory in the arbitration industry. In addition, as mentioned earlier,
professional associations are reluctant to sanction members who fail to
follow their privately promulgated standards of conduct. 375 Accordingly, any
regulatory impact that an arbitration professional association can have on the
conduct of its members is severely limited by its reluctance to compel its
members to abide by its rules. Self-regulation by voluntary professional
associations that are not required by law to sanction members for
noncompliance with their codes of conduct cannot be counted on to be an
effective regulatory tool. 376
b. Suggested Mechanisms to Make Protocols More Effective
Given the current regulatory environment, it is apparent that monitoring
compliance with the protocols and sanctioning arbitrators and providers who
fail to comply with the protocols is essential to make them effective. There
373 Ayres & Braithwite, supra note 324, at 39 ("In some respects, industry
associations can be more important regulatory players than single firms.").
374 For example, the NAA has developed a Code of Professional Responsibility that
is applicable to its members. The Code explicitly states that "[t]he National Academy of
Arbitrators will expect its members to be governed in their professional conduct by this
Code." National Academy of Arbitrators Code of Professional Conduct, Application of
Code, available at http://www.naarb.org/code.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
375 See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text. The arbitration industry is not
alone in its reluctance to sanction its members. See Gunningham, supra note 9, at 69
(discussing fact that trade groups never terminate membership for failure to follow the
group's code of conduct).
376 See Karmel, supra note 284, at 1312 (compulsory membership in professional
association and power to discipline necessary for effective self-regulatory scheme).
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are a number of different ways that such monitoring and enforcement can be
achieved, which will be discussed below. However, before any monitoring
can take place, standards need to be drafted that address the question of what
the monitoring system should measure. 377 At a minimum, the system should
measure the arbitrator's and the provider's actual compliance with the
protocol in each case handled and the processes they have engaged in to
ensure such compliance.
i. Self-Monitoring and Self-Reporting
One option that can be used is self-monitoring and self-reporting. Such
reporting should be standardized and made public so that comparisons can be
made among arbitrators and providers.378 This option has the benefit of being
less costly than other options that will be considered, and it provides some
transparency so that the "market" can presumably work to provide some
regulation. 379 However, self-reporting without explicit sanctions has been
used in other industries and is generally not considered effective. 380 In
addition, if the only "enforcement" of the standards comes from the market
itself or through "informal means of coercion, the transferal of norms, and
diffusion of best practices," 381 it is unlikely to be effective.
External monitors and enforcers are generally deemed to be more
effective in policing a self-regulatory scheme. There are at least two
possibilities when external monitors are used: a government entity, or a third-
party group which would act as "surrogate regulators; monitoring or policing
the code as a complement or alternative to government involvement." 382 Of
course, a combination of these two options can be used as well.
377 See Gunningham, supra note 9, at 71.
378 Id.
379 The market could work in a number of ways. The parties who use arbitration
service providers, assuming they have a choice, can decline to retain a provider if that
provider's record with respect to compliance is not satisfactory. Provider organizations
may expel an arbitrator from the pool of available arbitrators if that arbitrator has an
unsatisfactory record. In addition, professional associations may also decline membership
to those who fail to comply with the protocols.
380 See Gunningham, supra note 9, at 69-70 (noting that "self-monitoring and self-
reporting" are significant problems that negatively impact on the effectiveness of the self-
regulatory effort in the chemical industry); see also, OSTROM, supra note 282, at 45.
381 King & Lennox, supra note 283, at 698 (citation omitted).
382 Gunningham & Rees, supra note 299, at 402-03.
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ii. Monitoring and Enforcement by the Government
Government involvement can take a number of forms. At a minimum,
government involvement is needed to make those arbitrators who are not
otherwise bound to follow the protocols (because they do not work through a
provider organization or belong to a professional association) comply with
the protocols. 383 Accordingly, some kind of legislation is needed requiring
those who serve as arbitrators and who provide related administrative
services to follow the protocols.
In addition, a government agency can also provide oversight and
enforcement of the industries' compliance with its own privately
promulgated standards, thereby creating a co-regulatory scheme. 384
Oversight should involve external verification and audits of those providing
arbitration services.
The government agency must also have the power to sanction those who
do not comply with the protocols. Firms and individuals that choose to
breach the self-regulatory scheme may do so because it will "generate a
higher immediate return ... than will [complying with the rule] unless [the
breach] is detected and a sanction ... is imposed that makes [it more costly
to breach]. '385 With respect to identifying the appropriate kind of sanction
that will make noncompliance more costly than compliance, the literature
suggests that graduated sanctions be used. 386 If there is only one enforcement
tool and it is a significant one, enforcers may be unwilling to use it.387
Accordingly, an enforcement pyramid can be developed where the sanction
increases if the uncooperative behavior persists. 388 If the industry knows that
the enforcers are willing to sanction, individual members may be deterred
383 Id. at 394 (explaining that "self-regulation can only work if the government
intervenes directly to curb the activities of non-participants if members of an industry
refuse to commit").
384 "[E]ffective co-regulation must involve a willingness on the part of government
to take tough measures if industry betrays the trust that has been placed in it to regulate
itself." Gunningham, supra note 9, at 90.
385 OsTROM, supra note 282, at 44.
386 See id. at 186; AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 324, at 35.
387 Id. at 36.
388 See id. at 35, 39. In order to possess effective enforcement mechanisms, other
changes may need to be implemented in the arbitration industry. Requiring arbitrators
and providers to obtain licenses to provide arbitration and administrative services could
provide an effective enforcement tool. While a first time failure to follow the protocols
should not result in revocation of the license, repeated failure could result in either the
suspension or revocation of the license. For a compelling argument for licensing of
arbitrators see Sabin, supra note 333, at 1370-71.
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from acting opportunistically. The collective benefit the industry hopes to
attain through the use of self-regulation may then be realized. A self-
regulatory scheme, "underpinned by some form of state intervention" is
deemed "more resilient and effective than self-regulation in isolation. 389
Government oversight of an arbitration program is not unprecedented. In
the securities industry, customers and employees of broker-dealers are
frequently compelled to arbitrate the claims they have against the broker-
dealer.390 Those arbitrations take place pursuant to the arbitration program
developed by one of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs).391 The
arbitration rules of the SRO, while privately promulgated, must be approved
by the SEC. In addition, the SEC has the power to require a SRO to adopt
rules with respect to the conduct of arbitrations. 392
Government involvement can also be more than disciplinary. 393 The
government may become involved in standard-setting. 394 In that regard, the
government can, with the input of the arbitration industry and the public,
make changes to the due process standards set forth in the protocols to deal
with changes occurring in the practice of arbitration and in the use of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses. Such changes could enhance the protocols' ability
to provide employees, consumers, and patients with a fair and effective
process of dispute resolution. Some of the areas ripe for change are detailed
later.395
Government regulation is not without its problems however. Numerous
concerns have been voiced about the limits of government regulation. It is
considered to be expensive and inflexible. It is criticized as "intrusive or
inefficient, and... frequently.., subverted. '396  Moreover, government
regulation is considered to be limited in its ability to impact on the ethical
389 Gunningham & Reese, supra note 299, at 366.
390 See, e.g., Securities Arbitration-How Investors Fare, G.A.O. Pub. GGD-92-74,
(May 11, 1992) (finding that arbitration is the most frequently used method of resolving
securities disputes).
391 SRO is defined as "any national securities exchange, registered securities
association, or registered clearing agency, or... the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2000).
392 The Securities Exchange Act empowers the SEC to amend the rules of the SROs.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000).
393 See Karmel, supra note 284, at 1300 (noting that government regulation, like
self-regulation, can be disciplinary).
394 Id.
395 See infra note 457-64 and accompanying text.




behavior of those it regulates. 397 In addition, because "government can
operate only by proscription, . . . large areas of conduct and activity too
minute for satisfactory control," are left unregulated.398 Concerns have also
been voiced that government regulation can be too easily captured or co-
opted by interest groups. 399 Finally, government regulation is limited because
"the state simply cannot afford to do an adequate job on its own." 400 Such
limitations counsel against the exclusive use of the government to regulate
the process of arbitration.
iii. Monitoring and Enforcement by Third-Party
"Surrogate Regulators ", 401
Because of the limits of government regulation by itself, or in tandem
with a self-regulatory scheme, a preferable model to make the protocols more
effective would be the creation of a group that would be responsible for
monitoring compliance 402 with each protocol and for enforcing such
compliance by the imposition of graduated sanctions. 40 3 For purposes of this
Article, such groups will be called "oversight groups."
397 Karmel, supra note 284, at 1304 ("Self-regulation, rather than governmental
regulation, generally has been considered better able to address ethical, as opposed to
legal, conduct"); see also Gunningham, supra note 9, at 58 ("Moreover, because self-
regulation contemplates ethical standards of conduct which extend beyond the letter of
the law, it may significantly raise standards of behavior.").
398 Karmel, supra note 284, at 1304 (citing Justice Douglas when he was Chairman
of the SEC).
399 Cf Gunningham, supra note 9, at 90 (noting that regulatory process in co-
regulatory scheme can become co-opted by business).
400 AYREs & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 324, at 103.
401 See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 299, at 402-03.
402 Monitoring can be accomplished in a number of ways. It can include a
requirement that the arbitrator or provider report on its compliance with the protocols.
Audits by the group can be conducted to verify such reports. Monitoring can also be
accomplished by requesting specific information regarding the arbitration process from
the actual users of arbitration services. Rules will have to be drafted by the group to
preserve the confidentiality of the information obtained.
403 Maitland calls this group a "peak organization" and describes it as follows:
Peak (or "encompassing") organizations are not merely larger special interest
organizations. By virtue of the breadth and heterogeneity of their membership, they
are transformed into a qualitatively different phenomenon. Indeed, peak
organizations are likely to exert pressure on the behavior of their members in the
direction of the public interest.
Maitland, supra note 261, at 139.
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Ideally, these groups should be composed of a variety of individuals and
entities who have an interest and a stake in the arbitration of employment,
consumer, and health care disputes. These groups, at a minimum, should
include representatives from the groups of persons most affected by the pre-
dispute arbitration clause: employees, consumers, and patients. The groups
should also include representatives of the arbitration industry and those who
draft their agreements with pre-dispute arbitration clauses: employers,
merchants, and health care providers. The more inclusive the organization is,
the more likely it will "resist efforts by part of its membership to obtain
private benefits at the expense of other parts."'404 Use of such an oversight
group will result in a model where the users of the common resource "play a
major role in monitoring- each others' activities. '40 5 Self-regulatory schemes
designed in this manner have, in other contexts, been successful.406 Because
such oversight groups are necessary to the effectiveness of the arbitration
industry's self-regulating effort, the industry itself should be responsible for
facilitating the creation of such groups and financing their activities.
A model already exists for creation of such oversight groups. As was
detailed earlier, the Task Force, the National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee, and the Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution, which
developed the Employment, Consumer and Health Care Protocols,
respectively, were composed of a variety of persons interested in the use of
arbitration as a dispute resolution process. 407 While these groups included
representatives with a wide range of interests, "major demographic
stakeholders" 40 8 must be included in the membership of each group in order
for the group to have any legitimacy.409
I suggest that three different groups be created to oversee compliance and
enforcement with each of the three protocols because significant differences exist in the
practice of arbitration in each area, in the identity of individuals or entities who have an
interest in such arbitration, and in the provisions of each protocol that warrants separate
oversight of each protocol.
404 Id. at 139-40.
405 OSTROM, supra note 282, at 59.
406 See id. at 58-102.
407 See supra notes 120-22, 202-03, 218 and accompanying text.
408 See infra text accompanying notes 431-34 (discussing concern that group
responsible for draft of Employment Protocol did not contain all "major demographic
stakeholders").
409 One of the challenges that will have to be faced in connection with the creation
of such oversight groups is that some stakeholders may refuse to be associated with the
arbitration industry in any capacity. If that is the case, and major stakeholders cannot be
represented in the oversight group, the group will not succeed and public enforcement by
the government of the private standards embodied in the protocols will be the only viable
alternative to the current scheme of self-policing.
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In order for this model to work, the group has to be given the power of
compulsion. 410 The arbitration industry must agree to be monitored by the
oversight group and to abide by the sanctions the group imposes for any
breach of the protocols found through such monitoring. It is more likely,
under this scheme, that the industry will, in fact, cooperate. Through its
representatives, the industry will have a voice in how that monitoring should
be conducted and what the sanctions should be for noncompliance. "Mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon" is considered the "classic solution to the
collective action problem . . .411
The existence of oversight groups, which have the power to monitor and
enforce the protocols, can benefit those impacted by mandatory arbitration in
other ways. For example, the groups can also play a role in standard setting.
The groups' work will give them a bird's eye view as to the sufficiency of
the actual standards of the protocols to provide due process protections to
those compelled to arbitrate. They can suggest changes to the protocols based
on issues they have found in practice, or based on changes occurring in
arbitration law, or in the contractual arbitration provisions. The groups can
also monitor and oversee other aspects of the services that the providers
supply. They can monitor the providers' roster to ensure that those on it
represent, as promised by the providers, a diverse group of arbitrators; they
can monitor the training programs required by the provider to ensure that the
arbitrators made available to the parties are competent and well-trained. They
can determine whether party complaints to the provider organization about,
among other things, an arbitrator's conflict of interest, were adequately
addressed by the provider.
The oversight groups may also exert pressure on those arbitrators who
have not committed to abide by the protocols to publicly announce their
intention to follow the protocols. Each group can maintain a database
identifying those arbitrators who have agreed to be bound by the protocols,
detailing any complaints made against an arbitrator for failing to follow the
due process protocols, along with information regarding the resolution by the
oversight group of such complaints. A recalcitrant arbitrator, knowing that a
potential user can "check" his or her commitment and record of compliance
with an oversight group, may be persuaded to comply with the protocol.
The willingness of the industry to abide by the protocols and to be
monitored provides the public with the transparency that is missing in the
current scheme. Such transparency is needed not only to deal effectively with
the free-rider issue, but also to ensure that the reasonable expectations of the
parties, and of society as a whole, are being met by the arbitration process.
410 See Maitland, supra note 261, at 139.
411 Gunningham, supra note 9, at 81 (quotations omitted).
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Such transparency will also likely lead the public to form a favorable
impression of the arbitration industry's commitment to due process. By
agreeing to be monitored, the industry can shed its image of secretiveness.
Use of an oversight group that has the power to compel compliance with
the privately promulgated standards embodied in the protocols, is
unprecedented in the arbitration industry412 and will, no doubt, be a tough
sell.413 In a self-regulatory scheme, "[slubstantial benefits have to be
obtained to make costly monitoring and sanctioning activities
worthwhile." 414 Monitoring and sanctioning of the arbitration industry
clearly provides significant benefits to the industry that outweigh the costs
associated with such activities. It may be the one way for the industry to head
off more intrusive (and maybe more burdensome and inefficient) government
regulation at either the federal or state level. 415 In the same vein, it may help
the industry maintain the immunity it enjoys from civil lawsuits. 416 It may
also be the only way for the industry to realize some of the theoretical
benefits of self-regulation: "Because standard setting and identification of
breaches are the responsibility of practioners with detailed knowledge of the
412 The securities industry established a task force to develop a uniform code of
arbitration procedure that would apply in all SRO arbitrations. That task force, named the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), was composed of members of the
SROs, the Securities Industry Association and the public. See Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration, Second Report of the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposal for a Uniform Code of
Arbitration 2 (Dec. 28, 1978). SICA developed, among other things, uniform rules, that
were adopted by the SROs and approved by the SEC. See Harding, supra note 335, at
123.
Since the creation of the uniform code, SICA has continued to play an active role. It
"monitors the actual performance of the [Uniform] Code, and further fine-tune[s] and
adjust[s] its provisions, as the need arises." Constantine N. Katsoris, The Resolution of
Securities Disputes, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 307, 317 (2001). Although SICA
plays an overall "watchdog" role, it lacks the power to compel compliance with the
uniform rules. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited? 59 BROOK.
L. REv. 1113, 1152 (1993) (analogizing SICA to the "cop on the beat"). That lack of
power, however, is arguably not as significant as it is with respect to the arbitration
industry's compliance with the protocols because the SEC itself has the power to compel
the SROs to comply with the arbitration rules.
413 See Maitland, supra note 261, at 143-45 (discussing the barriers to "business
self-regulation by a peak organization taking root in the U.S.").
414 OSTROM, supra note 282, at 36.
415 See supra note 328 (discussing recent legislation in California aimed at
regulating the arbitration industry).
416 See supra notes 355-61 and accompanying text discussing arbitral immunity.
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industry, this will arguably lead to more practicable standards, more
effectively policed. 4 17
The industry's agreement to be monitored may also be the only way
arbitration as a dispute resolution process can maintain its favored status, and
as mentioned, may help improve the public's view of arbitration by
providing much needed transparency. That alone may be worth the cost of
monitoring and enforcement. If the public is favorably impressed with
arbitration, fewer challenges to arbitration agreements may occur, and more
individuals may be inclined to agree, either pre-dispute or post-dispute to
arbitration as a dispute resolution process.
The lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in the protocols is
a serious weakness that impacts the arbitration industry's commitment to the
protocols and its ability to prevent free-riding. Such weakness in the
protocols is particularly damaging considering that there are so few restraints
on the industry as a whole. In order to be an effective self-regulatory scheme,
the industry must abandon this current model, and adopt a model that gives
power to an external entity to monitor and enforce the protocols. If the
industry is unwilling to give that power to an oversight group, the
government must step in to provide the much needed oversight.
c. Substantive Adequacy of the Standards
No matter how many credible commitments are obtained or how well the
firms in the industry are monitored and sanctioned, the effort to regulate
arbitration will only be successful if the standards that are set to govern the
collective action are deemed substantively adequate. A legitimate concern is
raised when an industry sets the standards by which it will be judged.418
Some believe that those standards will be produced by taking into account
the interests of the industry only and not the interests of the public. Once
those standards are set, the industry will be able to avoid direct government
regulation that would be more responsive to the public's interest:
[S]elf-regulation has an extremely tarnished image, and is often reviled by
conservationists, consumer organizations and other public interest groups
for being a charade-a cynical attempt by interested parties to give the
appearance of regulation (thereby warding off more direct and effective
government intervention) while serving private interests at the expense of
the public .... "Self-regulation is frequently an attempt to deceive the
public into believing in the responsibility of a[n] irresponsible industry.
417 OSTRoM, supra note 282, at 58.
418 See Gunningham, supra note 9, at 68 (discussing the "credibility obstacle"
caused by "regulation of the industry, by the industry, for the industry").
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Sometimes it is a strategy to give the government an excuse for not doing
its job."4 19
However, the protocols are not a typical industry self-regulatory scheme. In
industry self-regulation, members of an industry set the rules and standards
"relating to the conduct of firms in the industry."420 In addition to the
presence of the arbitration industry, groups outside of the arbitration industry
were also present and took part in the drafting of each of the protocols. 421
The presence of "outsiders" in the drafting of the protocols make the
self-regulatory effort more like business self-regulation than industry self-
regulation.422 Accordingly, while the protocols primarily regulate the
conduct of arbitrators and arbitration service providers, they also seek, both
directly and indirectly, to regulate the conduct of those businesses and
419 Gunningham & Rees, supra note 299, at 366, 370 (citing John Braithwaite,
Responsive Regulation in Australia, in REGULATION AND AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE 91 (P.
Grabosky and J. Braithwaite eds., 1993)).
420 Id. at 364-65.
421 As mentioned, the Task Force which produced the Employment Protocol
consisted of representatives from a variety of organizations including the AAA, ABA,
NELA and the ACLU. See Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 178.
The National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee which produced the
Consumer Protocol was composed of representatives with a variety of backgrounds and
from a variety of organizations. Not only was the AAA represented but so were persons
from organizations that represent the interests of consumers, including the Consumer
Frauds and Protection Bureau of the New York State Attorney General's office and the
Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission. In addition, persons
with experience representing the providers of goods and services were also present,
including former counsels to AT&T and General Motors Corp. See Consumer Protocol,
supra note 2, at List of Signatories. The reporter for the Consumer Protocol found that
the advisory committee, responsible for drafting the protocol, "came to the table with
many different viewpoints." Stipanowich, supra note 305, at 821. He described the
committee as follows:
The group included, among others, consumer advocates with various reservations
about contractually mandated participation in ADR, corporate attorneys with
considerable experience in the drafting of consumer contracts, and agency
representatives with a regulator's perspective. The diversity of the group was
mirrored by its leadership: the co-chairs were a well-known former California
appellate judge and counsel for leading financial institutions and the director of the
ADR Unit of the Virginia Consumer Protection Division.
Id.
The Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution, which was responsible for
producing the Health Care Protocol, was co-chaired by members of the ABA, AAA and
the AMA. See supra note 2.
422 Maitland, supra note 261, at 137.
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entities that include arbitration clauses in agreements dealing with
employees, consumers, providers, and purchasers of health care services.
For example, direct regulation of the conduct of a provider of goods and
services can be found in the Consumer Protocol. In Principle 2, the protocol
directs such providers to give consumers certain information regarding the
alternative dispute resolution program.423 In a health care dispute, if a plan
mandates mediation, the Health Care Protocol states that the health plan
should pay the costs of such mediation. 424
Indirect regulation is apparent in all of the protocols but probably most
apparent in the Employment Protocol. There, arbitrators are instructed to
reject cases "if they believe the procedure lacks requisite due process." 425
The possibility of such rejection may temper the conduct of those who would
use the arbitration process to gain unfair advantage and lead them to follow
the procedures set forth in the protocol. That, of course, is the hope of the
creators of the protocol-those who insist on arbitration will also voluntarily
agree to follow and be bound by the protocol. If they do not voluntarily
agree, such users of arbitration will be unable to find arbitrators or provider
organizations (because all have voluntarily agreed to insist that the protocol
be followed in all arbitrations) to hear and administer their cases. This kind
of business coordination is precisely one of the benefits of self-regulation on
a business-wide basis.
Self-regulation on a business-wide basis, encompassing diverse interests,
is an attractive alternative to industry self-regulation because the code of
conduct it adopts, while maybe not "superior" to the code the industry itself
may adopt, is superior insofar as it is a "common" code that "enables firms to
coordinate their behavior." 426 A code produced by the diverse interest group,
a "peak confederation or peak organization" 427 even if only "morally
binding," may have greater success in influencing the conduct of individual
players in the industry because it embodies "good practice" and "serve[s] as
423 Principle 2 provides in relevant part:
Providers of goods or services should undertake reasonable measures to
provide Consumers with full and accurate information regarding Consumer ADR
Programs. At the time the Consumer contracts for goods or services such measures
should include (1) clear and adequate notice regarding the ADR provisions,
including a statement indicating whether participation in the ADR Program is
mandatory or optional, and (2) reasonable means by which Consumers may obtain
additional information regarding the ADR Program.
Consumer Protocol, supra note 2, at Principle 2.
424 Health Care Protocol, supra note 221, at Principle 10.
425 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 175.
426 Maitland, supra note 261, at 138.
427 Id. at 137.
447
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a standard against which corporate behavior could be judged in individual
cases." 428
By including persons knowledgeable of the interests of employees,
consumers and health care participants in the drafting process of the
protocols, the protocols have avoided, to some extent, the credibility problem
that generally plagues industry self-regulation. "[S]elf-regulation seems to
exist in a legal and political vacuum, striving for a legitimacy that it may
never fully attain."429 Because of the diversity of the memberships of the
groups that drafted the protocols, it is much more difficult to make the claim
that the drafting groups "align[ed] [themselves] with the sectional interests of
particular firms or industries," 430 and drafted standards that benefited the
industry only. However, at least one commentator has raised a concern about
the diversity of the task force involved in the drafting of the Employment
Protocol:
[A] glaringly apparent problem exists in the development of the ADR
Protocols. There was an obvious lack of participation of representatives
from many of the very classes of individuals the civil rights statutes were
erected to protect .... [I]t is inappropriate to fail to appreciate the tragic
impact of the de facto exclusion or denial of participation of trained and
qualified racial and ethnic minorities, women, and disabled voices in the
development of the protocols. This group of individuals are some of the
major shareholders in the process.431
While Professor Green does not argue that the actual drafters of the
Employment Protocol "were incapable of or did not intend to develop a
protocol which seeks to be fair and regular in addressing the rights and
interests of various affected individuals,"432 she nonetheless makes the
salient point that inclusion of the "major demographic stakeholders" would
have provided the drafters with a "different perspective" which may have led
to the adoption of different standards. 433 Green discusses a number of
428 Id. at 138.
429 Karmel, supra note 284, at 1299.
430 Maitland, supra note 261, at 137.
431 Green, supra note 55, at 215.
432 Id. at 215 n.286.
433 Id. Professor Green stated her understanding of the membership of the task force:
As far as the author understands, of the twelve representatives who participated in
the development of the ADR Protocol, none were members of a racial or ethnic
minority or disabled. Nor were there any participants whose main purpose was to
represent the interests of these groups. Only one was a woman, and there was no
indication from the information provided that she represented a group dedicated to
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standards that may have been different. Among others, she focuses on the
protocol's "waffling" on the issue of the acceptability of pre-dispute
arbitration clause. Professor Green also notes that the provisions regarding
arbitral costs may be inadequate.434 Many claimants with statutory
employment claims, she notes, are likely to be members of disadvantaged
socio-economic groups, and the least likely to be able to afford the costs of
arbitration. Because employers receive financial benefits from arbitration,
Professor Green asserts that the costs and fees of arbitration "should be borne
by the employer." 435 The composition of the roster of arbitrators called for in
the Employment Protocol is also deemed inadequate by Professor Green
because, although it provides for a roster of arbitrators and mediators who are
"diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, experience, etc.," 436 it does not
include racial minorities. 437
Although the task force may not have been as diverse as it ideally could
have been, it is not claimed that it was controlled by the arbitration service
industry. Nevertheless, "the more inclusive or encompassing the
organization, the larger the fraction of society it represents, and so the higher
the probability that it will oppose self-serving behavior (by sections of its
membership) that inflicts external costs on the rest of society. 438
Other deficiencies have been noted by other commentators. For example,
after reviewing the Employment Protocol, Professor Stone concluded that "it
presents at best a bare minimum" of due process standards. 439 She found that
it provides employees with "few, if any, significant process rights." 440 She
takes issue with its lack of guidance for ensuring arbitrator impartiality. She
women's issues. There were also no representatives of employees in lower socio-
economic groups or of the aging workforce, specifically.
Id. at 215 n.285.
434 See supra text accompanying note 179 (discussing the Employment Protocol's
provision regarding costs).
435 Green, supra note 55, at 219. As will be recalled, this is precisely the rule
adopted by the Cole court. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
436 Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 174.
437 Green, supra note 55, at 215.
438 Maitland, supra note 261, at 140. As Professor Maitland observes:
Peak (or "encompassing") organizations are not merely larger special interests
organizations. By virtue of the breadth and heterogeneity of their membership, they
are transformed into a qualitatively different phenomenon. Indeed, peak
organizations are likely to exert pressure on the behavior of their members in the
direction of the public interest.
Id. at 139.
439 Stone, supra note 54, at 1045.
440 Id.
449
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notes the ambiguous treatment of arbitral expense44 1 and she found the
provisions regarding the competency of the arbitrator to be "extremely
weak." 442 Lack of guidance regarding "what constitutes a knowing
agreement to arbitrate" has also been noted as a weakness of the Employment
Protocol. 443 It should be noted here that an evolution has occurred in the
drafting of the protocols regarding this issue. The Consumer Protocol which
followed the Employment Protocol provides much more detail regarding the
steps that a provider of goods and services should take to facilitate knowing
consent to the arbitration clause. 44 4
Finally, the Employment Protocol has been criticized because it does not
give the employee enough information about the potential arbitrators. In that
regard, it has been found that the information available to the employee in a
non-union arbitration fails to "replace the institutional memory that an
employee loses when he or she is not represented in the arbitration process
by a labor union." 4 5
The concerns raised by Professor Green and others regarding the
Employment Protocol's treatment of pre-dispute arbitration clauses and the
adequacy of its standards reflects a fundamental concern regarding the use of
privately promulgated standards: "Most private standards are 'consensus'
standards .... This process seems practically designed to ensure that
standard-setters follow the path of least resistance. The need for
consensus... leads to a 'watering down' of many standards." 446 The due
process protocols are clearly consensus-based standards. 44 7 The drafters of
the Employment Protocol were candid about the difficulty they had regarding
the appropriateness of pre-dispute arbitration provisions and explicitly stated
441 See also Arbitration: Attorneys, Arbitrators Mull Arbitrator's Role in Case
Where Claimants Have No Counsel, 32 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) CI (Feb. 16, 2000) ("A
flaw in the arbitration protocol, according to [Richard T. Seymour, director of the
Employment Discrimination Project at the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law] is that it does not bar the imposition of costs on claimants far greater than the costs
they would have to pay if they took their claim to court.").
442 Stone, supra note 54, at 1046.
443 FitzGibbon, supra note 141, at 227.
444 See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
445 Bingham, supra note 370, at 119.
446 Gunningham & Rees, supra note 299, at 372 (citing Ross CHEIT, SETTING
SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 176 (1990)).
447 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 54, at 1045 ("The Due Process Protocol thus appears




that the task force was unable to achieve a consensus on that issue.448 The
result of the failure to reach a resolution of this issue, however, allowed the
status quo to continue even in the face of significant opposition to the use of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment agreements, voiced by, among
others, the Dunlop Commission and the EEOC. The status quo clearly
favored the arbitration service industry.
Thus, it is clear that when confronting the most difficult policy issues-
issues of national importance-self-regulation, even when engaged in by a
group representing diverse interests, is of limited utility. 449
While differences of opinion exist as to what the actual standards of due
process should be in the protocols, and while the standards are undeniably
"consensus" standards, achieving a consensus on a single set of standards
still has value for a number of reasons. "[S]ince the Gilmer decision, some
consensus has evolved as to the elements and standards of fair process for the
binding arbitration of discrimination claims." 450 That consensus is capable of
exerting pressure on those involved in the arbitral process to conform their
behavior: "A code of conduct-even if only morally binding--can be
expected to exert a powerful constraining influence on the behavior of
would-be defectors." 451 In addition, promulgation of a single set of standards
drafted by a diverse group of persons is also essential in getting
commitments to follow those standards: "[W]hen there is a multiplicity of
standards, there is effectively no standard at all, because no firm can be
confident that its competitors are playing by the same rules." 452 A common
code will make firms more willing to adhere to it because they arguably are
not putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage by following rules more
stringent than those followed by others in the industry.
448 See Employment Protocol, supra note 1, at 172. The drafters of the Consumer
Protocol were likewise unsuccessful; Stipanowich, supra note 130, at 12. As previously
mentioned, only the drafters of the Health Care Protocol were more successful: "In
disputes involving patients, binding forms of dispute resolution should be used only
where the parties agree to do so after a dispute arises." Health Care Protocol, supra note
2, at Principle 3.
449 Members of Congress have attempted on numerous occasions to prohibit the use
of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. For example, Senator Feingold has proposed bills,
which would prohibit the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment
agreements and in consumer credit transactions. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection
Act, S. 163, 107th Cong. (2001); Consumer Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act of 2002,
S. 1117, 107th Cong. (2001). Those bills, like the rest of the proposed legislation seeking
to make changes to the law and practice of arbitration on the federal level, have not yet
passed.
450 FitzGibbon, supra note 141, at 243.
451 Maitland, supra note 261, at 138.
452 Id.
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The common standards are also important because, as their drafters
recognized, they represented a first step in the evolution of arbitral due
process standards.453 As a first step, they began the formal dialogue
regarding the standards necessary to ensure a fundamentally fair process for
those lacking bargaining power over the arbitration clause. Those standards
have been used to guide both courts and legislatures. The providers who
endorsed the protocols also committed themselves to adhering generally to
due process standards, in whatever form they are articulated. Accordingly,
those providers have revised their rules to reflect the evolution in due process
standards as crafted by the courts called upon to determine the validity of an
arbitration scheme. 454 Because of this practice, those advocating the use of
arbitration for certain types of disputes also advocate that the arbitration be
conducted pursuant to the rules of one of the key arbitration service
providers; 455 by providing for arbitration administered by an organization
that adheres to due process standards, challenges to the arbitration provision
may be avoided or minimized.
While providers have attempted to amend their rules to reflect certain
changes in the due process standards articulated by the courts, it is time for
the protocols to be revisited if they are to continue to be a legitimate tool of
self-regulation. The protocols need to be amended, not only to include
monitoring and enforcement provisions, but also to reflect current law and
practices. Certain current issues in arbitration need to be vetted by a diverse
group of stakeholders to determine appropriate standards. Although the point
of this Article is not to critique each of the standards contained in the
protocols, it is nonetheless clear that, putting aside the issue of the use of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses, 456 the standards can be improved.
For example, the protocols do not do an adequate job regarding the
controversial issue of repeat players. Commentators believe that repeat
453 See supra note 238; see also Stipanowich, supra note 130, at 13 (noting that the
Consumer Protocol is not an "endpoint" in the evolution of arbitral standards).
454 Neesemann, supra note 196, at 16 (noting that arbitration service providers
"strive to keep their guidelines and/or rules up to date with the shifting legal terrain" and
providing two examples: the revision of JAMS's employment guidelines in response to
the Armendariz case and the revision by the AAA of its consumer rules in response to
Green Tree).
455 Id.; see also, Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration
Clause: Drafting and Implementation Issues Which Should be Considered by a Consumer
Lender, 1172 PLI/Corp 17, 19 (2000) ("In developing an arbitration program,
consideration should be given to 'A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration
of Consumer Disputes.'").




players do better in arbitration than one-shot or incidental players. 457 The
protocols provide no mechanism for alerting a party to the fact that the other
party may be a repeat player nor does it provide a remedy in the event that a
party is a repeat player.458 Disclosure of the relationship between the
provider and the parties, whether formal or informal, must be required, and,
in the event one party is deemed a repeat player or has a significant
relationship with the provider that produces the appearance of partiality, the
non-repeat player must be given the option of using an alternative arbitration
service provider, or the judicial forum.
The protocols also need to be amended regarding costs. It is clear that in,
among other things, the employment and consumer context, the costs
associated with bringing a claim in an arbitral forum can be prohibitively
high. 459 Although some providers have rules permitting the waiver of certain
costs if a party is unable to pay or require the employer to pay certain
expenses incurred in the arbitration,460 such rules are not required by the
protocols. Accordingly, the due process protocols should be amended to
explicitly require that the party imposing arbitration bear the costs associated
457 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, at 190-91 (1997). But see Ware, supra note 362, at 751-
53 (questioning whether the repeat-player effect is present in cases comparable on the
merits, and asserting that "too much" is made of the repeat-player effect).
458 Disclosure of the relationship, whether formal or informal, between an
arbitration service provider and a party is required in the CPR-Georgetown Commission
on Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR. See Principles for ADR Provider
Organizations, supra note 305, at 994-95.
The AAA "declined to fully endorse" the Provider Principles, even though it
endorsed the "basic premises of the Principles which encourages transparency and
disclosure." Id. at 984 n.5.
459 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(recognizing that "large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from effectively
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (mem.) (holding that arbitration provision unconscionable when
consumer unable to pay fees and costs of arbitration); Rhode v. E & T Inv., Inc., 6 F.
Supp. 2d 1322, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (mem.) (holding that unconscionability may be
found if showing made that costs of arbitral forum render party unable to pursue
remedies); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998);
(holding that excessive costs associated with arbitrating consumer claim before
International Chamber of Commerce rendered arbitration provision substantively
unconscionable); Teleserv. Sys., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659, 664-
65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that arbitration provision requiring excessive filing
fee unconscionable on its face); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 866-67
(Ohio 1998) (holding that excessive costs rendered clause unconscionable).
460 See, e.g., AAA's National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes,
available at http://www.adr.org. (last visited Sept. 13, 2003).
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with it. The concern raised by those imposing arbitration that frivolous
claims will be brought if costs are not shared between the parties seems
highly unlikely and nevertheless can be addressed in other ways.461 The
protocols should also set up standards requiring the provider to facilitate the
payment of costs to the arbitrator so that the arbitrator is not made aware of
how the costs are allocated.
Conflicts of interest remain a serious concern to those compelled to go to
arbitration. The protocols require impartial and neutral arbitrators. Certain
relationships between an arbitrator and a party must be disclosed and if such
disclosure suggests a conflict of interest, the arbitration cannot continue
unless the party has consented to the potential conflict of interest. However,
the sufficiency of the "disclose and consent" approach has been questioned,
particularly in the context of an arbitration which occurs because it was
imposed upon a party in a contract of adhesion. 462 In that case, the argument
has been made that certain conflicts of interest should be non-waivable or
non-consentable. 463 Accordingly, the protocols need to be revised to identify
those conflicts that should lead to automatic disqualification of an arbitrator
or provider.
The use of classwide arbitration, particularly in the context of consumer
claims, needs to be addressed in the protocols and the effect of arbitration
clauses that attempt to bar claimants from proceeding as a class needs to be
resolved. Accordingly, it is imperative that major stakeholders, including
consumers and employees, the arbitration industry, and providers of goods
and services, carefully examine the myriad of issues and develop standards
regarding the circumstances when class action arbitration may be
desirable.464
Because the protocols were crafted by persons representing diverse
interests in arbitration, they are able to somewhat overcome the credibility
problem usually associated with industry self-regulation. However, the
protocols are nonetheless consensus standards and, for that reason, they are
not as stringent as they could be. Nevertheless, such consensus standards
have value in articulating a code of conduct that is capable of exerting
461 It has also been argued that arbitrator impartiality may be impacted if the
drafting party is required to pay the costs of the arbitrator. At least one court has rejected
that argument. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
462 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 960-61.
463 See id.
464 See generally Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the
clash between binding arbitration and class action procedure and detailing the restrictions
on the use of arbitration clauses to abolish class actions and the limits to and the
desirability of class action arbitration).
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pressure on those subject to it to conform their behavior accordingly. Still,
the impact of the protocols can be greater if the protocols are revisited to
address certain issues in the context of the fact that much of the arbitration to
which the protocols relate comes about through the inclusion of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion.
The kind of self-regulation that has taken place in the arbitration industry
has undeniably had a positive impact on the arbitration of employee and
consumer disputes. The role such self-regulation on a business-wide basis
can have on issues of national importance is, however, limited. Federal
congressional action on those issues is needed; industry self-regulation, even
when conducted in the manner connected with the drafting of the protocols,
is incapable of adequately handling those issues.
V. CONCLUSION
The need to regulate the arbitration industry became acute after the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer and the judicial and administrative
systems' failure to provide affordable access to justice for the growing
number of employment discrimination claims. The protocols are a
commendable attempt at self-regulation. The existence of the protocols has
transformed the role of arbitration service providers. Instead of merely
administering a case as set forth in the arbitration clause, the industry,
because it has committed itself to the protocols, now reviews those clauses to
make sure they conform to the due process standards articulated in the
protocols and incorporated into their rules. Prior to that adoption and
incorporation, obtaining a court order was the only avenue available to a
person subjected to a one-sided arbitration agreement to challenge the
agreement. Now, the providers perform the role as gatekeeper and decline to
administer claims that do not meet due process standards. That alone has had
a significant impact on the practice of arbitration and the preservation of
certain rights of individual claimants, including employees and consumers.
As long as all providers equally perform that role, the procedural playing
field can be leveled for employees, consumers, and others forced to go to
arbitration pursuant to a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
The model used in crafting the protocols, where numerous persons with
diverse interests participated in the process, and the incorporation, to some
extent, of the time-tested labor arbitration procedures, save the protocols
from falling into the category of "sham" industry standards. However, the
protocols contain two weaknesses that seriously undermine their
effectiveness: (i) the lack of any mechanism for monitoring compliance
therewith, and (ii) the failure to provide for sanctions for those who fail to
abide by their agreement to follow the due process standards contained in the
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protocols. Efforts should be undertaken to ensure that all arbitrators and
providers, particularly those who are not affiliated with a major arbitration
service organization, commit to adhering to the principles set forth in the
protocols. The commitments of all should be monitored and the monitoring
entity should have the authority to enforce adherence to the protocols. While
various options exist to fulfill the need for policing and enforcement, the
ideal option would be the creation of an oversight entity which would
include, at a minimum, the stakeholders most affected by pre-dispute
arbitration clauses: employees, consumers, and patients.
While the standards of due process required in the arbitral forum are
evolving, the protocols began the process and achieved the promulgation of
standards much more quickly than could have been achieved on an ad hoc
basis by the courts when determining the enforceability of an arbitration
clause,465 or has been achieved by Congress since the Gilmer decision.
The protocols have not, however, eliminated the need for legislation
governing arbitration. One of the limits of self-regulation and its reliance on
consensus standards as the industry standard is apparent in the Employment
and Consumer Protocols, which failed to reach consensus on the
appropriateness of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. That issue,
regarding the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a condition of
employment or as a condition of obtaining a consumer good or service, still
needs to be addressed by Congress. Significant differences of opinion exist
as to this issue and the collective judgment of Congress is needed to resolve
the issue so that the interests of the public are achieved. In addition,
congressional action is also needed if it is in the public's interest to offer
disputants more than minimum standards in the arbitral forum.
Congressional action is also needed to ensure that all providers of
arbitration services adhere to the protocols and may also be necessary if the
industry is unable to effectively monitor its commitment to the protocols or if
it fails to adequately enforce the commands of the protocols. If the arbitration
industry is incapable of resolving due process issues not addressed by the
protocols, 466 or if it does not respond to the judiciary's pronouncements of
due process standards, Congress may also need to step in to provide the
appropriate command and control legislation. Finally, congressional action
may be desirable in order to have "one voice" speak as to the necessary due
465 Cf. Gorman, supra note 14, at 681 (noting that it may be more efficient for
Congress to pass legislation regulating arbitration of statutory employment disputes,
which would "rationalize and speed up the process that would otherwise take the courts
many years (if not decades) to complete").
466 See Neesemann, supra note 196, at 16 (noting that the due process standards of




process standards for arbitration of statutory disputes. In some instances, the
courts and the protocols have been at odds regarding the standards that must
exist for the arbitration agreement to be enforceable. 467 Multiplicity of
standards may undermine the industry's attempt at self-regulation and
confusion is created that ultimately will lead to additional litigation between
the parties to an arbitration agreement, precisely the action that the
arbitration industry seeks to avoid.
467 See supra notes 460-61 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of
allocation of costs in employment arbitration); see also Great Western Mortgage Corp. v.
Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 n.42 (3d Cir. 1997) (court compelled arbitration after JAMS
refused to arbitrate because "Great Western's arbitration policy failed to meet JAMS's
standards of procedural fairness").
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